Since the Chernobyl accident in 1986, an increasing number of Western organizations and companies have offered to help improve the safety and operation of Soviet-designed nuclear plants. Initially, some of this assistance was slowed or stalled because of coordination problems and liability concerns. The coordination problem has been largely overcome, and progress is being made with respect to third-party liability.
The Group of Seven major industrialized nations--the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, Japan and Italy--have adopted a coordinated policy on aid. The countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have moved to protect Western companies installing safety equipment at Soviet-designed reactors against damages in the event of an accident. Lithuania and the four Eastern European countries with Soviet-designed nuclear plants--the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria--are signatories to the Vienna Convention, which ensures that the responsibility for damage caused by a nuclear accident is channeled to the plant operator. In addition, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Russia have all enacted nuclear laws containing liability provisions, while the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary and Lithuania have drafted such legislation and expect enactment in 1996.
However, the lack of adequate third-party liability protection still blocks major upgrades to Soviet-designed nuclear power plants. Most Western contractors and suppliers remain unwilling to install safety-related equipment that directly affects Russian and Ukrainian plants' reactor operation because of the lack of full legal and financial protection in the event of an accident.
A major challenge now facing both East and West is the transition from government assistance programs to commercial relationships.
In an attempt to impose order on the proliferation of aid to the East, the Group of 24 (the member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, plus Turkey), the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), the Commission of the European Communities (CEC)--now the Commission of the European Union--and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) met in Brussels in 1991. As a result, the G-24 created a Working Group on Nuclear Safety, and asked the CEC to establish a secretariat to act as a clearinghouse, setting up meetings and collecting information.
The G-24 nuclear safety working group met in February, July and September 1992, and at the September meeting it set up a 10-country executive steering committee with representatives from both East and West. The working group, which brought together aid donors and recipients, established several technical working groups to address specific issues such as improvements to VVER-440 Model V230s and RBMKs, training, and regulation. In addition, the working group asked the secretariat--the Nuclear Safety Assistance Coordination Center--to improve the coordination of assistance programs.
Setting Up Database. To help it keep track of all the bilateral aid programs, as well as the activities supported by the multilateral fund, the G-24 Nuclear Safety Assistance Coordination Center relies on a special database created with the IAEA. According to the database, the G-24 nations have funded or proposed to fund more than 850 nuclear safety-related projects--660 of which are under way or completed--at a cost of 917 million ECU ($1.16 billion). The G-24 Nuclear Safety Assistance Coordinating Center uses this information to identify duplication, overlap and gaps in ongoing and planned projects. The IAEA has reviewed and critiqued the database, and is adding its own database on safety issues to that on donor projects.
Although many bilateral assistance programs were under way in the early 1990s, some of the G-7 nations--notably Germany and France--wanted to create a multilateral fund to get help flowing for short-term improvements at older RBMKs and VVER-440 Model V230s, which was not being done through bilateral efforts. When the G-7 leaders met in Munich in July 1992, they agreed to create such a fund.
The Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) was established in February 1993 by the donors--the countries of the G-7, plus the European Union. The NSA is open to all countries. In addition to the donors, those having pledged or made contributions include Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
The NSA was created to supplement bilateral aid efforts, in particular those activities that individual countries are unable or unwilling to undertake. The fund is being used for improvements in both operational safety (development of accident procedures, organizing operations hierarchy) and safety-related hardware (safety systems monitoring equipment, leak detection devices, fire detection, emergency diesels).
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is staffing and administering the NSA. A steering group of representatives from donor countries--the Assembly of Donors--identifies prospective recipient countries. The EBRD suggests country-specific projects and the Assembly of Donors has final approval of the projects.
NSA Projects. The first project approved was a 24 million ECU ($30.24 million) grant to Bulgaria for upgrading safety at the Kozloduy plant's units 1-4.
A second grant--33 million ECU ($41.6 million)--was awarded to Lithuania to purchase equipment for short-term safety upgrades at the Ignalina plant. A portion of the grant is being used for a safety assessment, which is expected to be completed by the end of 1996. The Lithuanian regulatory body will use the assessment to help make a decision on the plant's continued operation.
The next two projects are in Russia, one at the Leningrad plant and the second, a joint project between the Novovoronezh and Kola plants. The Leningrad plant--which has the status of a separate operating utility--will receive 30.62 million ECU ($38.58 million), and Rosenergoatom--the operating utility for the Novovoronezh and Kola plants--will receive 44.9 million ECU ($56.6 million). In addition, Gosatomnadzor--the regulatory authority--will receive 0.9 million ECU ($1.13 million) to use in setting up a full licensing system for Russia's least-safe reactors, the RBMKs and VVER-440 Model V230s. The grant agreement stipulates that this system be used to evaluate whether the plants should be shut down or permitted to operate for a limited time.
All grant agreements include conditions that are designed to lead to the phased shutdown of the units receiving short-term upgrades. In addition, all agreements require that recipients develop an acceptable energy-sector plan that takes into account nuclear safety.
In June 1994, the European Union pledged 100 million ECU ($126 million) in grants over three years to help Ukraine develop energy-sector programs that would enable it to close the Chernobyl nuclear power plant as early as possible. The EU also offered 400 million ECU ($504 million) in Euratom loans for the reactors' completion.
The following month, the G-7 agreed to provide a grant of up to $200 million in support of an action plan for Ukraine's energy sector that could lead to the early decommissioning of the Chernobyl plant. At their meeting, the G-7 leaders called on other donors and international financial institutions to provide support for the action plan.
During talks in the fall of 1994, Ukrainian officials reportedly told the G-7 that the country agreed in principle to close Chernobyl. In December, a joint task force was created--representing the G-7 and the Ukrainian government--to flesh out the action plan by deciding on specific actions to be taken, who would take them, how much they would cost and what their time frame would be.
In April 1995, President Kuchma said that Ukraine would develop a timetable for closing Chernobyl by 2000. To effect closure, the government said $4 billion in Western aid was needed for decommissioning, fixing the sarcophagus surrounding the damaged Unit 4, developing alternative energy sources, and defraying the social costs of closing the plant. At their June meeting, the G-7 leaders congratulated President Kuchma on his commitment to shut down Chernobyl by 2000, and offered to mobilize an additional $2 billion for energy assistance to Ukraine.
By the end of October, the two sides were working on a plan to provide $1.8 billion in credits and $500 million in grants to restructure Ukraine's electric power sector and shut down Chernobyl. In addition, the G-7 wanted Ukraine to contribute $900 million, according to a Ukrainian news service. In late November, Ukrainian and G-7 negotiators agreed on a draft memorandum of understanding on Western support for such a comprehensive plan.
Ukraine and the G-7 signed the memorandum in December 1995 in Canada, which served as chairman of the G-7 in 1995. Under the agreement, the G-7 will provide $498 million in grants already committed, and $1.809 billion in international and Euratom loans.
Ukrainian officials have reportedly said, however, that the agreement is not legally binding, and bilateral agreements must be concluded with each of the G-7 member countries. In early January 1996, the Ukrainian parliament told President Kuchma that he needed assurance of Western financial assistance before taking any concrete steps to decommission Chernobyl.
WANO. In addition to the OECD's NEA, the CEC and the IAEA, the World Organization of Nuclear Operators (WANO) is involved in the G-24's activities through its special project--initiated by the Moscow and Paris WANO centers--to suggest improvements to reactors in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
International Lenders. Although the EBRD is administering the Nuclear Safety Account, two other international lending bodies--the World Bank and the European Investment Bank (EIB), which is the financing institution of the European Union--also have roles to play.
The EIB is considering the adoption of policies that would allow it to fund nuclear safety projects in Eastern Europe, including longer-term projects for the VVER-440 model 213 and VVER-1000 reactors. For the longer term projects, the EIB will administer a 1.1 billion ECU ($1.39 billion) loan facility for Euratom. At present, the World Bank's policy is to fund no construction of new nuclear power plants or improvements to operating units. Instead, the bank is helping countries with these reactors to strengthen other aspects of their power sectors to ensure the development of market-oriented power sectors that are capable of supporting externalities such as safety.
In addition to these lending institutions, some of the export/import agencies of the G-24 nations are providing funds to guarantee loans for nuclear safety projects, says a U.S. government official. It is U.S. policy to guarantee loans for projects involving Soviet reactors of more modern design--the VVER 1000. The U.S. Export-Import Bank, for instance, is guaranteeing a $317 million loan to CEZ, the Czech national utility, for Westinghouse Electric to upgrade and complete two VVER-1000 units at the Temelin nuclear power plant.
PHARE Program. The PHARE program, set up in 1989 for aid to Poland and Hungary, was extended in 1990 to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania.
Under the program, the EU provides--at a country's request--technical assistance, training, feasibility studies, and activities to improve countries' regulatory framework, build institutions and launch small pilot projects. It does not, however, fund major projects, leaving such investment to the private sector and international lending bodies.
In the nuclear energy area, PHARE's objective is to improve operational safety and operator training. PHARE activities in the former Czechoslovakia include a probabilistic safety assessment for the Bohunice nuclear plant, plus instrumentation and control studies for the VVER-440 Model V213 and the VVER-1000. During 1990-91, 7 million ECU ($8.8 million) was spent.
In Bulgaria, a crash project was launched in 1991 involving a "twinning" program in which the staffs of the Kozloduy plant and Western European nuclear plants exchanged experience; a "housekeeping" program for Kozloduy; and a special WANO-organized, six-month safety analysis.
In Lithuania, a 1.75 million ECU ($2.2 million) general energy project included a safety assessment of the Ignalina nuclear plant.
Expenditures for 1990-91 totaled 20 million ECU ($25.2 million). Under the PHARE program, 28.3 million ECU ($35.7 million) was allocated for operation improvements, safety authorities, safety studies and regional waste policy in 1992. For 1993, 25 million ECU ($31.5 million) was allocated, and for 1994, 25 million ECU ($31.5 million). The EU also allocated 5 million ECU ($6.3 million) of PHARE money in 1994 for the EBRD's Nuclear Safety Account. For 1995, 27 million ECU ($34 million) in PHARE funding was allocated for safety-related activities.
TACIS Program. Under a separate program of technical assistance, in 1991 the EC allocated 54 million ECU ($68 million) for nuclear safety measures in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries. This sum covered operational safety measures, mainly for the VVER-440 Model V230, training and management centers, and support of safety authorities. But with the breakup of that country, funding was delayed while the EC waited for the newly independent republics to decide how to divide up the money originally allocated to the U.S.S.R.
By early 1993, the logjam was finally broken, and the EC began evaluating bids of about 23 million ECU ($28.9 million) for 23 projects involving safety systems upgrade work, waste management, emergency procedures, measurement technology and training at VVER plants in Russia and Ukraine. Total funding for nuclear safety under the 1991 TACIS program was 32 million ECU ($40.3 million). Among the projects was one involving the transfer of Western probabilistic safety assessment and external events methodology and experience to Russia for use in identifying weaknesses, assigning priorities to modifications and verifying the validity of proposed modifications to VVER-440s and VVER-1000s.
For 1992, 80 million ECU ($100.8 million) was allocated for safety-related work under the TACIS program. An additional 20 million ECU ($25.2 million) was earmarked for the International Science and Technology Center. Of the 80 million ECU, 32 million ECU ($40.3 million) is intended for upgrades at six Russian plants--Kola, Kalinin, Beloyarsk, Smolensk, Balakovo and Leningrad (Sosnovyy Bor)--and two Ukrainian plants--Rovno and South Ukraine. The upgrades include: the installation of computerized protection systems; the provision of inspection tools for detecting cracks, welding equipment and spare parts; and the training of operators. To carry out the work, small teams of Western European experts went to the eight plants in the summer of 1993 for assignments of six to 12 months. Another 30 million ECU ($37.8 million) will be used for inspections and safety analyses of the plants.
For 1993, the EU allocated 88 million ECU ($110.9 million) for the TACIS program, and for 1994, 91 million ECU ($114.6 million). In addition, 7.5 million ECU ($9.5 million) was allocated in 1994 for the G-7 action plan. The EU also allocated 15 million ECU ($18.9 million) of TACIS money in 1994 for the Nuclear Safety Account. For 1995, 96 million ECU ($121 million) has been allocated for the TACIS program. The allocations for 1994 and 1995 included funding for the G-7's action plan for Ukraine.
Joint Assistance. With 8 million ECU ($10.1 million) in funding from the EU's PHARE and TACIS programs, a Western European consortium of four companies--Belgatom, Corys, Siemens and Thomson--will deliver multifunctional simulators for training plant operators to six nuclear plants: Kozloduy (Bulgaria), Dukovany (Czech Republic), Bohunice (Slovak Republic), Kola and Novovoronezh (Russia), and Rovno (Ukraine). The project, launched in January 1995, is expected to be completed in December 1996.
In addition to participating in the Nuclear Safety Account, a number of countries have launched their own efforts to improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors.
United States. In 1991, the U.S. government launched its first assistance program, with $3 million in funding earmarked for the three Eastern European countries with Soviet-designed reactors. In 1992, the U.S. government held the Lisbon Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. One product of the conference was a three-part program covering operational safety improvements, risk reduction and regulatory assistance. The government allocated $25 million for fiscal year 1992, with about $22 million going to the Department of Energy (DOE) and about $3 million to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
With this funding, DOE has helped to establish two training centers--one for Russia (at the Balakovo plant) and one for Ukraine (at the Khmelnitskiy plant)--to improve operational safety. The centers, which will be equipped with VVER-1000 simulators, will be used to train technical and maintenance staff as well as operators. The U.S. government is providing the simulator for Khmelnitskiy.
Under this part of the program, DOE is also helping Russia, Ukraine and the Eastern European countries to develop emergency operating procedures as well as normal written operating procedures for three major reactor types. Joint expert working groups--including Russians, Ukrainians, Americans and East Europeans--have been writing procedures for the VVER-440 Model V213, the VVER-1000 and the RBMK. Emergency operating procedures for the VVER-440 Model V230 were written by Working Group 11 of the Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety as part of the U.S. government's ongoing cooperation begun in 1988 with the Soviet Union.
For risk reduction, the initial effort focused on fire detection, prevention and suppression. DOE contractors have helped design, build and install fire protection equipment in Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine. The equipment is selected on the basis of a study of fire hazards and a walkdown at each plant. Other work involves provision of emergency diesel generators and leaktight sealant. For details, see DOE Programs.
The NRC is responsible for the regulatory assistance part of the program, which involves helping these countries to develop a regulatory management structure and establish a national basis for licensing and inspecting plants. Since 1992, Russian and Ukrainian regulators have visited the NRC each year to develop a list of activities they want to carry out under the program. For details, see NRC Programs.
For fiscal year 1993, the U.S. government provided $15 million for nuclear safety assistance activities in Ukraine, and $15 million for Russia. For fiscal year 1994, the government provided about $33 million in assistance for Ukraine and about $75 million for Russia. For fiscal year 1995, the government provided $9 million for Ukraine and $8.5 million for Russia.
The U.S. government also has a reactor safety assistance program targeted at Eastern Europe, but on a much more modest scale. Program funding for fiscal year 1992 was $4.5 million; for fiscal year 1993, it was about $3 million; for fiscal year 1994, $3.6 million; and for fiscal year 1995, $3 million.
In late 1993, the U.S. government signed agreements with both Ukraine and Russia that covered nuclear safety assistance activities and the provision of liability protection. Although both the Ukrainian and Russian governments agreed to shield U.S. companies from liability for any future accident, many U.S. contractors and suppliers have indicated that this agreement does not provide sufficient protection for them to risk the supply of equipment for safety improvements.
Japan. Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)--together with the country's Science and Technology Agency--has launched a program involving both short- and long-term technical assistance and a major operator training effort.
Under the training program, groups of operators, managers, maintenance personnel and inspectors from Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic have taken part in various two-week training courses in Japan. Over the course of 10 years, MITI plans to train 1,000 people.
As part of its short-term assistance, Japan plans to install a sophisticated early-warning system to detect coolant leakage in RBMKs and VVER-440 Model V230s. The country's long-term aid will entail the construction of an operator training center, with a simulator, at the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant in Russia. It will also include tests of VVER thermohydraulic safety.
Under an agreement signed by MITI and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy in mid-1993, Japan has given Russia a $25 million full-scope training simulator for use at the Novovoronezh plant, which has three VVER units. Novovoronezh is the training center for Russian VVER operators.
In fiscal year 1993, Japan earmarked 1.95 billion yen ($17.6 million) for seven categories of bilateral safety-related assistance to nuclear programs in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Germany. The German government first provided nuclear safety assistance for Soviet-designed reactors in 1991, when it gave Bulgaria's Kozloduy plant about DM 19.5 million ($13.2 million) worth of spare parts from the Greifswald nuclear plant in eastern Germany. Germany earmarked DM 33 million ($22.2 million) for bilateral nuclear safety assistance to the former Soviet Union in 1993 and plans to provide an additional DM 21 million ($14.2 million) in technical assistance to two VVER-1000 plants in Russia and Ukraine. In a joint venture with France, Germany will spend about $1.2 million to provide Russian nuclear regulators with a data communications network and other equipment, and about $450,000 to provide the same equipment to Ukrainian regulators.
In 1992, German nuclear plant owner-operators launched a twinning program with VVER plants in the East. The program involves the exchange of information and temporary assignment of personnel.
Through 1995, Germany will have contributed or allocated a total of DM 203.5 million ($137.4 million) for bilateral projects and DM 64 million ($43.2 million) for the Nuclear Safety Account.
France. France's utility, Electricité de France, and Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy signed an agreement in 1992 pledging closer cooperation between nuclear plant operators in their two countries. The agreement also called for the creation of a joint venture in engineering for nuclear plant operations.
EdF is also working with Russia's Rosenergoatom to develop accident procedures for the VVER-1000 and is discussing with that organization the transfer of a machine developed in France to repair vessel closure head flanges and the joint development of a mockup plant to train Russian technicians in maintenance techniques. In addition, Russian design institutes are said to be adopting EdF's double-walled containment design for a new generation of VVER-1000s, and EdF is helping the Russians with quality assurance and control for nuclear construction.
In mid-1993, EdF and a group of Russian institutes and companies agreed to develop an upgrade program for the VVER-1000. The program, issued in mid-1995, provides a methodology for selecting, classifying and prioritizing all the modifications considered necessary or desirable for safety, availability and operability of the VVER-1000.
By mid-1994, France had contributed a total of 230 million ECU ($289.8 million) for bilateral and multilateral projects: 65 million ECU ($81.9 million) for the PHARE and TACIS programs; 30 million ECU ($37.8 million) for the Nuclear Safety Account; and 135 million ECU ($170.1 million) for bilateral cooperation.
Canada. In 1992, Canada pledged $30 million (U.S. $21.9 million) to a nuclear safety initiative. The initiative includes a $11 million (U.S. $8 million) nuclear safety engineering program, $750,000 (U.S. $548,250) for participation in the RBMK consortium, $210,000 (U.S. $153,510) for a peer review project at Lithuania's Ignalina's plant, and $600,000 (U.S. $438,600) for the first phase of an internship and training program for regulatory staff from Lithuania, Ukraine and Russia. In May 1993, Canada contributed $7.5 million (U.S. $5.48 million) to the Nuclear Safety Account.
Sweden. Sweden provided Kr 70 million ($10.4 million) in bilateral aid to Lithuania over the 1991-93 period. Some of the funding has gone to the "Barselina" project, a cooperative effort among Sweden, Lithuania and Russia (see below). In addition, Swedish funding has been used to aid Lithuania's regulatory agency and for upgrades at Ignalina, in particular fire safety improvements.
Sweden has also contributed $3 million to the Nuclear Safety Account and has said it will contribute an additional $3 million. Sweden's Environment and Natural Resources Department requested Kr 56 million ($8.3 million) for fiscal year 1994-95 for nuclear safety and radiation programs in the Baltic countries.
Finland. The Finnish government has provided FM 14.4 million ($3.2 million) to fund two projects in Russia, one at the Kola plant and one at the Leningrad (Sosnovyy Bor) plant.
Lithuania and the four Eastern European countries with Soviet-designed nuclear plants--the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria--are signatories to the Vienna Convention, which ensures that the responsibility for damage caused by a nuclear accident is channeled to the plant operator. Lithuania passed a nuclear law in 1993 consisting essentially of the Vienna Convention's liability provisions. It has now developed nuclear legislation that includes a more comprehensive set of regulations. If approved by the government, it will be sent to parliament and then to Lithuania's president for final approval.
Three of the Eastern European countries with Soviet-designed nuclear plants--the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Hungary--have drafted nuclear legislation that includes liability provisions, and enactment is expected in 1996. Bulgaria enacted a nuclear law containing liability provisions in 1995. In addition, the Czech Republic established a nuclear insurance pool in July 1995, and the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria are taking steps to set up such pools.
Neither Russia nor Ukraine is a party to the Vienna Convention. In 1995, the Ukrainian parliament passed nuclear legislation that included a provision channeling legal responsibility for a nuclear accident to the operating organization. Although the measure was signed into law by President Kuchma, implementation must await the passage of a by-law by parliament. As a temporary measure, parliament gave the Ukrainian government the right to exempt foreign entities from responsibility for third-party nuclear damage. Also in 1995, both the upper and lower houses of Russia's parliament approved nuclear energy legislation that included a provision on nuclear liability.
The lack of adequate third-party liability protection still blocks some technical improvements to Soviet-designed nuclear power plants. Most Western contractors and suppliers remain unwilling to install safety-related equipment that directly affects Russian and Ukrainian plants' reactor operation because of the lack of full legal and financial protection in the event of an accident.
The government-to-government agreements on liability protection signed by Russia and Ukraine with the United States in 1993 satisfied several U.S. companies, and the U.S. assistance program is fully operational. A memorandum of understanding signed by the European Commission and Russia in February 1995--under which Russia offers liability protection to companies doing safety-related work under the EU's TACIS program--is considered adequate by many of those companies. The EC is reportedly engaged in discussions with Ukraine on a similar agreement.
Some Western companies have made it clear that they will only be satisfied when recipient countries become signatories to an international convention and adopt corresponding domestic legislation. This situation particularly constrains commercial relations that are not covered by government-to-government agreements or memoranda of understanding.
The Barselina project was a cooperative effort among Sweden, Lithuania and Russia to transfer the methodology for probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) from Sweden's Barsebäck plant to Lithuania's Ignalina plant. The aim of the project, run by SKI, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, was to assess the risks of accidents occurring at RBMKs and use the results to identify areas for improvement in system design and operating and maintenance procedures.
The project consisted of three phases: familiarization with safety systems, limited level 1 PSA, and full level 1 PSA. During phase 2, a qualitative PSA model of Ignalina Unit 2 was developed for testing and demonstration. Phase 3 was completed in mid-1994, and the results of the PSA identified a number of improvements in RBMK system design as well as operating and maintenance practices, some of which had been implemented by Ignalina or were under way.
Among the suggested improvements: increase the capacity of the reactor cavity relief system, provide redundancy and diversity of fresh water supply, improve reliability of main steam relief valves, improve battery capacity, diversify emergency power sources and improve operating procedures.
The project revealed the plant's weaknesses, but it also showed that the plant has advantages and good design features. If all the changes proposed by the project were made, the probability of a severe accident at Ignalina 2 could be reduced from one in 10,000 to one in 100,000 reactor years. The U.S. Department of Energy is carrying out a peer review of the results of the project.
Based on the work done for the Barselina project, Western experts have talked with officials from Russia's Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering--the design institute for RBMKs--and the Leningrad plant about carrying out a similar probabilistic safety analysis at the Russian plant. Representatives of the U.K.'s AEA Technology, the U.S. Department of Energy and the Swedish International Project are still negotiating with Russia over how to pay for the project.
In addition to the IAEA's RBMK study, discussed in the IAEA Programs section, the European Communities (now the European Union) commissioned an RBMK safety review. The purpose of the review was to develop a better understanding of the RBMK design and operation, which would enable Western experts to provide advice on safety improvements that might be funded by the West.
The review brought together four EU countries--the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy--and three other countries with ongoing bilateral projects in the former Soviet Union--Canada, Sweden and Finland--into a seven-nation Western consortium.
Working with this consortium is an Eastern counterpart--a group of former Soviet design and research institutes, plant operators and regulators. The activity of the two consortia--broken into nine technical task groups--is guided by a steering committee under joint British-Russian chairmanship. The task groups covered: system engineering and accident progression, protection systems, core physics, external events, engineering quality, operating experience and analysis, human factors, regulatory aspects, and probabilistic safety assessments.
Although the project was announced in October 1991, EU funding delays and problems in arranging terms with the former Soviet participants held up the launch of the review until early 1993. In March, the two consortia agreed to proceed with the one-year review, which was to incorporate EU-funded work at Russia's Smolensk 3, the newest generation of RBMK, work that Sweden has done at the Ignalina RBMK plant in Lithuania, and work that Finland has done at the Leningrad (Sosnovyy Bor) RBMK plant in Russia.
The EU agreed to provide 4.4 million ECU ($5.5 million) to cover the contributions of the four EU countries plus coordination of the review, and the three other countries contributed a similar amount.
The project, which was completed in late spring 1994, produced more than 300 recommendations--hardware changes as well as management and operational reforms--for improving RBMKs. Improvements to safety culture and management practices were considered a top priority for the improvement of safety, and the project members concluded that implementing these improvements would be highly cost-effective.
International Science and Technology Center. Officials from the United States, the Russian Federation, Japan and the European Union have established the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Russia to retrain ex-Soviet weapons scientists for new jobs outside the weapons field. Biological, chemical, nuclear and missile weapons scientists are working with U.S. companies, universities and government organizations through projects approved the ISTC board of directors. Several nuclear safety projects are under way through the center.
The center is headquartered in Moscow, with branch offices in Kazakhstan and Belarus. Initial funding came from the United States ($25 million), the EU ($25.2 million) and Japan ($20 million). Russia provides facilities for the center, as well as maintenance, utilities, security and related support.
In addition, the United States, Sweden and Canada have established a sister facility in Ukraine--the Science and Technology Center of Ukraine--for similar purposes.
Joint Core-Melt Experiments. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Nuclear Energy Agency is collaborating with Russia's Kurchatov Institute in experiments of the physical-chemical interactions between a molten core and reactor vessel steel. The results could be used in advanced reactor design as well as for mitigating the consequences of core-melt accidents at operating reactors.
This project, which was the object of bilateral cooperation between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Kurchatov Institute, was taken over by NEA's Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations.
The Kurchatov Institute is building a facility for the experiments, which are expected to cost about $5.5 million and run for three or four years. The Russians, who want to apply the results of the experiments to both current and planned VVER-1000 reactors, are apparently willing to pay for about 40 percent of the project's cost.
The project began in 1994, with a three-year budget of $6.9 million. The participating countries are: Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Fuel Cycle Consortium. In July 1993, five nuclear fuel cycle companies from the European Union formed the European Fuel Cycle Consortium to support EU programs aimed at enhancing the safety of Soviet-designed reactors.
Safety Organization Group. In August 1993, the heads of nuclear safety organizations in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain and Italy agreed to set up the Technical Safety Organization Group. A major aim of the group is to help coordinate the EU's assistance projects under its PHARE and TACIS programs.
IEC RBMK Study. In January 1992, a working group of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) proposed to undertake work aimed at improving RBMK instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. The IEC approved the proposal and began work in 1993, requesting support from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA provided financial and technical support, including Russian experts in RBMK I&C systems. The IEC and Russian project participants identified RBMK I&C safety issues and then made eight main recommendations for such systems as data processing, the shutdown system, fuel cooling, power distribution, leak detection and hydrogen monitoring.
January 1996
