In 1988, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) began exchanging information with Soviet nuclear experts with the aim of improving nuclear plant safety. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, much of this activity has taken the form of nuclear regulatory assistance to Russia and Ukraine as well as the Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania.
Laying the Groundwork. U.S. representatives and officials of the former Soviet Union began exchanging information informally in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, with investigation into the causes and consequences of the event. In April 1988, two years after the accident, they set up an official framework for information exchange by establishing the Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS). The JCCCNRS agreement resulted in the formation of 10 working groups that would address a range of issues involved in nuclear plant operations and design.
Each of these working groups set out with a specific technical objective. Issues addressed by the initial 10 working groups included: more efficient regulations, power plant safety analyses, reactor vessel integrity, fire safety, backfitting, accident analysis, radiation and environmental health effects, the exchange of operating experience, the diagnosis of plant conditions, and the effects of elements that threaten plant piping and components.
Another initiative in 1989 by then-U.S. Secretary of Energy James Watkins resulted in an 11th working group that focused on operating procedures, training, and management issues. A 12th JCCCNRS working group began work a year later and targeted plant aging and life extension.
Restructuring Under the Lisbon Initiative. With the announcement of the Lisbon Initiative in 1992 by then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, emphasis on nuclear safety cooperation with the U.S.S.R. shifted to nuclear safety assistance for Russia and Ukraine.
As a result, Russian, Ukrainian and NRC representatives developed priorities that concentrated on building a regulatory program for each new nation. Each country needed licensing programs, ways to train their inspectors, and methods for conducting plant inspections and setting up emergency response centers. In short, they needed all the programs necessary to regulate and inspect their nuclear plants. Above all, both Ukraine and Russia needed legislation to endow their regulatory agencies with the proper authority.
Working with NRC representatives in July 1992, Russian authorities established seven regulatory priorities, and Ukrainian authorities established 16.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) began to fund the effort through an agreement signed in September 1992. Under the agreement, AID authorized $25 million to fund assistance programs in the former Soviet Union. AID directed $3.1 million to the NRC to support the regulatory priorities for Russia and Ukraine. The balance of AID funds went to programs for which the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) was responsible.
By June 1993, AID had increased funding another $5 million, and the JCCCNRS structure had been modified to administer the new direction. Both Russia and Ukraine appointed directors for the JCCCNRS program. Russian appointed Victor Sidorenko, Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy, and Alexander Gutsalov, first deputy chairman of GAN, the Russian nuclear regulatory agency. Ukraine appointed Nikolai Steinberg, first deputy chairman of GANU, Ukraine's nuclear regulatory entity, and Nur Nigmatullin, deputy chairman of the State Committee for the Use of Nuclear Power. The U.S. chairmen were the NRC's Executive Director for Operations James Taylor and DOE Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy Frank Cole.
Of the 12 JCCCNRS working groups, four are still in operation, four have completed their work, and four have been subsumed by the Lisbon Initiative.
Four JCCCNRS working groups continue their operations (Working Groups 3, 6, 7 and 12).
Both U.S. and ex-Soviet members of this working group have shared lessons learned about the effects of neutron irradiation on the embrittlement of reactor pressure vessel materials, about the methods used in each country for evaluating the structural integrity of pressure vessels, and about the ability of thermal annealing to restore the ductility of pressure vessel materials to near their as-fabricated state.
Through this working group, U.S. representatives have witnessed a reactor-vessel annealing at the Novovoronezh plant's Unit 3 in Russia. Although such an annealing has never occurred in the United States, the NRC recently issued a regulation addressing thermal annealing, and one U.S. licensee is currently planning to anneal its reactor pressure vessel. The first-hand observation of the Russian annealing process was beneficial to the NRC in evaluating the engineering considerations for thermal annealing.
In evaluating the effects of neutron irradiation, Working Group 3 participants have emphasized experimental techniques for evaluating the condition of the materials. Experts have tested metals from both Russian and U.S. reactor vessels, and have carried out detailed metallurgical characterizations of these materials. They have also irradiated Russian materials in a reactor at the University of Michigan, and irradiated U.S. materials in the Novovoronezh reactor. Other analysis has taken place in the United States at the University of California at Santa Barbara and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Russian analysts have carried out additional work at the Kurchatov Institute.
Consideration is being given to combining Working Group 3 and Working Group 12. Future activities will be more focused to address specific collaborative projects of mutual interest.
Working Group 6 explores ways of preventing and mitigating severe accidents. The group analyzes physical forces and materials involved in an accident: in particular, thermal-hydraulics, hydrogen combustion/detonation, core debris coolability, containment integrity, and fuels and materials issues.
Early activities of the working group resulted in the Soviet Union's joining the International Code Assessment Program (ICAP), a multinational effort that involves the sharing of scientific and engineering information related to modeling accident conditions/scenarios and code verification. This program has been superseded by the Code Assessment and Maintenance Program. The Russians participate in this program, as well as in the Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, which involves about 15 countries.
A number of Working Group 6 activities--which during the early stages of the JCCCNRS primarily involved sharing scientific and engineering information--led to contract research work for the NRC by the Russian Research Center (Kurchatov) and the Russian Academy of Sciences. Plans call for this work to continue in 1996, and to involve:
Working Group 7 began as two subgroups, one addressing the health effects of the Chernobyl accident, the other focusing on the environmental effects. Since these two subgroups began their work in June 1990, more than 50 scientists have been involved in a number of special projects.
In 1995, U.S. participants focused on funding research in epidemiological and environmental studies that directly supported studies of the accident's impact on human health.
Activities in 1995 included:
Working Group 12 was established by the JCCCNRS in Moscow in 1990. The group adopted a general methodology for aging management and life extension of systems, structures and components, based on a U.S. approach. The methodology included:
The U.S. and Russian sides have exchanged information on several issues:
Consideration is being given to combining Working Group 12 and Working Group 3. Future activities will be more focused to address specific collaborative projects of mutual interest.
Four of the original JCCCNRS working groups have completed their activities (Working Groups 2, 4, 5 and 10).
This working group dealt with computer models and experience to analyze severe accidents. Team members compared baseline data used to project how a plant will behave in an accident. They also explored ways to apply new findings to future power plant designs. In 1989, the working group concentrated on hypothetical loss-of-coolant accidents for the Russian Rovno plant; then they compared results with a similar analysis of the Comanche Peak plant in Texas. The group also studied station blackouts and regulations that govern how operators shut down a plant during a loss of required AC power.
Working Group 4 concentrated on plant fire-protection features and on the safe shutdown of a plant after a fire. Working group members shared fire-fighting approaches, visiting facilities such as the Zaporozhye plant in Ukraine and the local fire brigade training and research center. Working Group 4 finished its activities in September 1991.
Working Group 5 concentrated on necessary plant improvements and shared information about continuing modernization and backfitting programs. U.S. team members shared their approach to implementing industrywide generic backfits with their counterparts. In particular, the working group targeted backfits for the Soviet-designed VVER-1000, VVER-440 and RBMK designs.
Working Group 10 studied corrosive elements that can threaten the integrity of plant systems. Of prime interest was plant water chemistry: how to control and improve it to guard against material degradation.
The new Russian and Ukrainian regulatory priorities under the Lisbon Initiative subsumed the activities of four of the original JCCCNRS working groups (Working Groups 1, 8, 9 and 11).
Working Group 1 began with a series of inspector exchange assignments in 1989, involving a trip by Soviet inspectors to Duke Power's Catawba plant, and a trip by U.S. inspectors to the then-Soviet Zaporozhye plant. Regulatory tours followed in 1990, with NRC representatives touring the offices of GPAN--the Soviet regulatory agency--and the Soviet inspection agency, and Soviet teams visiting NRC regional offices. In 1991, the working group concentrated on the observation of emergency preparedness drills at the St. Lucie plant in Florida. Work on building the legal and administrative framework for new Russian and Ukrainian regulatory agencies began in 1992.
Working Group 8 participants exchanged information about operating experience from one another's plants. Their objective: to target emerging safety issues. The working group focused on the use of performance indicators in the United States to measure such parameters as unplanned plant shutdowns, safety-system failures and unplanned outages. They also shared lessons learned in plant maintenance, human error and root-cause analysis. Working group participants agreed in early 1993 that the bulk of their work was done and future studies in operating experience would be carried out under Lisbon Initiative programs.
Working Group 9 sought better ways to help regulatory authorities evaluate the ability of plant operators to operate their plants. Its work included the demonstration of diagnostic systems, man-machine interfaces, signal-validation techniques, and management and automated control systems. The working group also shared information on control room monitors, as well as diagnostic systems used to detect problems with Soviet-designed VVERs and RBMKs.
This U.S. Department of Energy-sponsored working group has shared experience on operating procedures, plant personnel training and management systems in the United States and the former Soviet Union. In 1990, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations accepted a role as a key player. The working group began its efforts through specially formed "expert groups" focusing on operations, training and management issues. These groups began meeting at Russia's Novovoronezh plant in 1991 to help identify improvements needed at all plants of the same vintage as Novovoronezh's older units (see the DOE Programs section).
The major focus of the joint regulatory priorities has been technical assistance. The purpose is to transfer modern regulatory technology by imparting the methods used by the NRC and providing related computer and communications equipment. The intent is to provide assistance that offers near-term benefits that will have a lasting effect.
This project assists Russian regulators who are learning NRC practices for licensing nuclear power plants. Legal assistance provided under this priority enabled the Russian regulatory agency, GAN, to develop draft input for Russia's nuclear law. In November 1995, President Yeltsin signed the Russian law "On the use of atomic energy."
Teams of Russian regulatory representatives visited the United States to study licensing processes, computer hardware and software, and to visit the Watts Bar plant in Tennessee.
Several teams of Russian inspectors visited the United States. In addition, NRC inspectors visited Russia in connection with the joint inspection of Russia's Balakovo nuclear power plant in October 1995.
For this project, which began in 1993, the NRC is supplying a communications system for voice and data. Prototypes have been installed at two plants and GAN headquarters.
The NRC has worked with Russian counterparts to install engineering and scientific "work stations" that regulators can use to analyze severe accidents using U.S. computer codes.
This project called for the development of Russia's own regulatory training program over three years. The NRC provided the Russians with microcomputer systems and supplies for computer-aided training. The systems are helping to train Russian regulators on RBMK, VVER-440 and VVER-1000 designs.
Russian training managers visited the NRC's Technical Training Center to learn U.S. approaches in such areas as the use of training simulators, the equipment required for a well-run training facility and course materials needed.
These activities have resulted in several accomplishments:
In addition, plans were made for the Russians to acquire an automated system for simulating a VVER-1000, known as an analytical simulator.
This priority focuses on the development of systems to control and account for nuclear materials that could be diverted for unauthorized purposes.
The NRC provided Russian regulators with a comprehensive technical document outlining the U.S. approach to fire protection. Russian regulators visited the United States for a training course on NRC licensing requirements for fire protection that included classroom instruction and visits to U.S. nuclear plants and laboratories.
This project's goal is to plan the program of assistance with the Ukrainian regulatory agency.
Ukrainian regulators, technical managers and other key staff took part in training programs at the NRC's Technical Training Center to explore a broad range of subjects involved in building and operating a regulatory agency. The Ukrainians studied such subjects as training qualifications, recruitment and development programs for NRC staff, training program content, inspection fundamentals and operator licensing programs.
Like the Russians, Ukrainians also received assistance in securing microcomputer systems to help train on plant types designed under the old Soviet regime. In addition, plans were made for the Ukrainians to acquire an analytical simulator.
This project actually consists of two efforts: Priority 3.1 involves training Ukrainian regulators on the NRC's approach to licensing plants; priority 3.2 involves training on how to do safety analyses using U.S. methodologies.
A Ukrainian representative has studied the NRC licensing process firsthand with a visit to the Comanche Peak plant in Texas, and the NRC has also trained Ukrainian managers, through two-month programs and one six-month program, in the responsibilities of licensing project managers.
As with Russian assistance efforts, the NRC has been training Ukrainian regulators how to use U.S. computer codes and how to perform safety analyses.
This project actually focused on an activity that occurred in 1992: the joint evaluation by NRC and Ukrainian staff of the Khmelnitskiy plant. The findings served as a baseline for the creation of Priority 5, discussed below.
With the results of the joint evaluation of the Khmelnitskiy plant, the NRC has been helping Ukrainian regulators develop a process to assess plant performance.
Ukrainian representatives have visited the United States to study the NRC's approach to regional inspections, and NRC inspectors have visited Ukraine to assist in the development of regional inspection programs there.
Ukrainian regulators will accompany NRC inspectors on site inspections.
Ukrainian and NRC officials have been meeting since 1992 on the issue of establishing a legal framework that would enable Ukraine's regulatory agency to exercise enforcement and impose penalties on those plants that fail to meet regulatory requirements.
Assistance in this area is provided by the U.S. government under the Comprehensive Threat Reduction Program. The NRC is assisting in this effort.
The project has involved a thorough review of Ukraine's past and current practices regulating nuclear materials. One of the initial projects was to begin an inventory of radioactive waste and determine how regulatory practices have affected waste management practices.
The NRC provided Ukrainian regulators with a comprehensive technical document outlining the U.S. approach to fire protection. Ukrainian regulators visited the United States for a training course on NRC licensing requirements for fire protection that included classroom instruction and visits to U.S. nuclear plants and laboratories.
Ukrainian Priority 11: Developing an incident response center
Working with Ukrainian representatives, the NRC is seeking to 1) define response roles in an emergency for the Ukrainian regulatory body and other Ukrainian organizations and 2) develop the support and communications network needed in an emergency through a step-by-step process, with testing for each phase.
This project involves setting up a system by which Ukrainian regulators can quickly collect information on plant operating experience so they can improve plant safety. The NRC is working with Ukrainian staffers to establish ways of processing information on 1) plant component failures, 2) plant events and 3) human performance.
Ukrainian and NRC officials have been learning the rudiments of one another's legal systems. The NRC's plan has been to develop a regulatory philosophy and mission for Ukraine's agency, and to review draft legislation. In February 1995, President Kuchma signed nuclear legislation, providing jurisdictional authority for the regulator.
This program involves work between senior Ukrainian officials and NRC representatives in developing Ukrainian research capabilities.
This program involves an assessment of the use of radioactive "sources" in medicine and industry, as well as a review of past regulatory practices in these fields.
Since Ukraine has simply adopted the former Soviet Union's system for regulating the transportation of radioactive materials, the Ukrainians are seeking to implement their own system. One of their top priorities is the development of a training system for inspectors.
In addition to its projects for Russia and Ukraine, the NRC provides assistance to all five countries in Central and Eastern Europe with Soviet-designed reactors: the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania. By and large, the NRC's objective has been to help these countries improve their ability to regulate their plants. Programs have involved in-depth training of regulatory administrators and inspectors, the exchange of technical information, and safety-analysis tools.
The first general bilateral agreement was signed in April 1989 with Czechoslovakia. A second formal bilateral agreement for assistance was signed with Hungary in September 1990.
Lithuania signed its first formal agreement with the NRC in April 1994. Renewing their assistance agreement with the NRC, the new governments of the Czech and Slovak republics signed new agreements in November 1994. Bulgaria has remained involved in NRC assistance programs but has not yet signed a formal agreement.
The NRC began seeking financial assistance for its Central and Eastern European programs from the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) in late 1990. In October 1991, AID released $575,000 in funds for NRC assistance to Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In March 1992, AID amended the agreement to provide an additional $150,000 for assistance to Bulgaria.
An additional $900,000 in AID funds became available in October 1992 to fund assistance for the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania. Apart from programs already in progress and supported by the 1991 budget, the 1992 AID funds were also to help finance membership by all five countries in the International Piping Integrity Research Group, a consortium of government and industry organizations that fund large-scale pipe-fracture experiments under realistic conditions.
The NRC received $1.6 million in funding for fiscal year 1993, $1.5 million for fiscal year 1994, and $1 million for fiscal year 1995.
Program Development. Before funds were available, early NRC assistance programs in Central and Eastern Europe took shape through special visits by senior NRC representatives. With the first Czechoslovak agreement, for example, NRC personnel visited the Dukovany plant as well as the Skoda heavy machinery plant. With the advent of AID funding, however, more formal programs began to evolve. Among them:
A nuclear safety orientation program involving discussion of a wide range of regulatory and safety issues that either U.S. or Eastern European representatives initiated. For example, summer 1992 meetings in Prague and Budapest involving Czechoslovak Federal Republic and Hungarian representatives centered on topics such as reactor vessel embrittlement and annealing, the integrity of plant piping, piping leaks and reconstruction of the older VVER-440 Model V230 plants.
By fall 1993, as many as 14 Czech, 11 Hungarian and two Slovak regulators had visited NRC headquarters in Rockville, Md., the NRC's Technical Training Center in Chattanooga, Tenn., and the Beaver Valley nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania under the safety orientation program.
An NRC fellowship program that allows regulators from Central and Eastern European countries to see the U.S. regulatory process through NRC eyes. The program began by allowing Central and Eastern European "fellows" to work alongside NRC staff, developing work programs and taking on projects that relate to their particular regulatory interests. The first fellows--one from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and one from Hungary--came in June 1992 and worked at the NRC for six months.
Legal and regulatory assistance designed to provide Central and Eastern European counterparts with a broad picture of the legal system behind U.S. nuclear regulatory systems and practices. In 1993, for example, two Hungarian regulators and one Slovak regulator received a two-week overview on such issues as the U.S. legal framework for the NRC, approaches in making rules that govern nuclear issues, ways to involve the public in the NRC's rulemaking process and the enforcement of NRC rules.
Training in the use of NRC-developed nuclear safety computer codes in such areas as thermal-hydraulics, severe accident analysis and probabilistic risk assessment. These codes provide models by which engineers design, operate and modify nuclear power plants. Codes can, for example, offer verifiable information that engineers can reference when they want to know how certain plant components or systems behave in either normal or accident conditions. Over the years, U.S. and international engineers and regulators have developed a variety of valuable computer codes. The NRC's code program helps teach Central and Eastern European representatives how to use these codes and permits them access to users groups that are composed of experienced international representatives.
In January 1993, for example, the NRC sponsored a two-week course for Lithuanian regulators on thermal-hydraulic codes. These codes can provide baseline information on how piping and other plant components respond to varying water temperatures and pressures. Other Central and Eastern European representatives participated in a fall 1993 week-long course in New York City on the American Society of Mechanical Engineers' boiler and pressure vessel codes and standards--equipment fabrication codes that American engineers routinely apply to the design and operation of nuclear reactor vessels.
A nuclear inspection program intended to educate inspectors from nuclear safety bodies in the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria about the plant inspection procedures used by the NRC. The ultimate goal: to provide inspectors in these countries with approaches they can adapt to their own programs.
The program involves two tracks: 1) a two-week course for chief inspectors and 2) a two-month course for resident inspectors who are located at the plant site. Chief inspectors received their first course offering in June 1993, and the resident inspectors in August 1993. The courses allow the visiting inspectors to work side-by-side with NRC inspectors; they provide on-the-job training in inspection practices; they include sessions at the NRC Technical Training Center in Chattanooga, Tenn.; and they allow participation in actual inspections. In September 1994, the NRC expanded the program with a two-month course offered to plant inspectors from all Eastern European countries that provided trainees for the 1993 courses.
Assistance in regulatory rules and guidelines. This program helps Central and Eastern European countries organize their regulatory structures, review current regulatory procedures and develop new safety rules. In May 1993, for example, the NRC sponsored a month-long trip of a senior NRC specialist to Budapest, at the request of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission, to review Hungarian regulatory programs.
Throughout 1994, the NRC continued to provide guidance for burgeoning regulatory functions in Central and Eastern Europe through its training and orientation programs, its fellowship programs, its assistance on the use of computer safety codes and its programs targeting specific regulatory needs.
Continued Training Programs. Among key 1994 activities:
The NRC took its training program abroad to Prague with a two-week October 1994 course for managers. The objective was to train Czech managers in how to replace old, inefficient management styles from the communist era with modern Western management approaches.
The NRC also conducted a week-long training course on nuclear reactor safety in Piestany, the Slovak Republic. Bulgarian, Slovak, Czech and Hungarian regulatory representatives attended.
Code Training. In 1994, the NRC's code assistance programs continued to address three areas: thermal-hydraulics, severe accidents and probabilistic risk assessments. Work on pipe-fracture experiments was also continued.
The NRC renewed membership for the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania in the Code Assessment and Maintenance Program. This program allows Central and Eastern European countries to tap into the latest information on thermal-hydraulic codes.
The NRC supports Czech, Slovak and Hungarian participation in the international Severe Accident Research Program, which concentrates on codes that engineers use to project severe accidents. The NRC also extended offers of participation to Bulgaria and Lithuania.
The NRC continued its support of the Second International Piping Integrity Research Group.
The NRC backs the participation of the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary and Lithuania in an international users group that studies probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) codes. The group is known as the SAPHIRE Probabilistic Risk Assessment Users Group. The NRC also offered training courses in how to use software for PRA codes, such as a September 1993 course at NRC headquarters for all five Central and Eastern European countries.
Assistance to Temelin Plant. With Westinghouse Electric Corp. contracted to supply fuel and an instrumentation and control system for the Czech Temelin plant, the NRC is helping Czech regulators who will license the modified plant by giving them assistance in NRC licensing approaches. Among lead activities for the two-year program: Two representatives of the Czech State Office of Nuclear Safety traveled to the United States in June 1994 for a nine-month program at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The program focused on licensing approaches for fuel as well as instrumentation and control systems.
Visits by NRC Representatives. In June 1994, NRC representatives visited the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary and Lithuania. The purpose of the visits was to assess the progress made by their Central and Eastern European counterparts in applying the regulatory inspection procedures learned at the NRC and defining new areas of cooperation. The NRC visitors found the most aggressive implementation of new inspection procedures by the Slovaks. They also concluded that the Slovak, Hungarian and Czech regulators had benefited from the inspector training programs and that regulators in these countries had implemented more formal inspection systems. NRC representatives also outlined additional assistance activities for Lithuania's regulators from VATESI, the Lithuanian regulatory authority.
During 1995, the NRC continued to assist the development of effective regulatory organizations by: promoting safety culture awareness and practices, strengthening the legal framework and regulatory capabilities, improving analytic capabilities for performing safety analyses, and strengthening inspectorates through intensive training in NRC regulatory inspection philosophy, procedures, and technique.
The NRC has emphasized a regional approach by including representatives from all Central and Eastern European countries. The need to respond quickly to the recipient countries' changing assistance priorities has demanded flexibility of the agency.
Among key 1995 activities:
Regional Activities. The NRC offered a seismic margin analysis course in February in Budapest. Although Eastern European nuclear power plant operators are now carrying out a variety of safety reviews to reduce risks, they need training in state-of-the-art seismic evaluation techniques developed in the United States to cost effectively assess their actual seismic risk and/or vulnerabilities. Walkdowns of Hungary's Paks plant and the Slovak Republic's Bohunice plant were included in the course.
The NRC conducted a tutorial on risk-based regulations in March. Participants spent one week in the NRC's Office of Research, one week in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and one week in Atlanta at NRC's Region II office. The tutorial included many meetings with NRC technical staff and a three-day course on human reliability analysis at NRC headquarters.
Through NRC sponsorship, several participants from Central and Eastern Europe attended a training course on U.S. commercial nuclear power plant fire protection practices conducted by Brookhaven National Laboratory. The training provided an understanding of NRC's requirements and the licensing and inspection practices for fire protection at U.S. commercial plants. Participants also learned about the U.S. nuclear energy industry's fire protection and post-fire shutdown practices. As part of the course, the participants toured the Beaver Valley nuclear plant and discussed fire protection features and post-fire safety shutdown design configurations. They also toured a fire test facility at Underwriters Laboratories.
In response to a request from the Slovak Republic's Nuclear Regulatory Authority for training on formal procedures for the verification and validation of computer codes to be used in analyzing VVER reactors, the NRC hired Scientech Inc. to conduct such a course at the republic's technical training center in Trnava in September. Participants from the Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania were shown the general methodology for applying the relevant computer code, or set of codes, to VVER reactors for a given design-basis analysis. They also learned how to verify that a given code produces valid results.
NRC representatives attended the second regular meeting of the Association of the State Nuclear Safety Authorities of the Countries Operating VVER-Type Reactors, which was held in the Slovak Republic in May. Among the participants were the nuclear authority chairmen of Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Finland. Bulgaria was represented by the director of nuclear safety. Topics covered included: country reports on the safety status of nuclear facilities; information on safety significant events; illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials across state boundaries; adherence to the Vienna Convention on Nuclear Safety; and decommissioning and radwaste treatment. Four technical working groups reported on cooperative program accomplishments.
The Czech Republic. The NRC has continued to support training for the Czech regulatory authority--provided by the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--in evaluating the safety of the Temelin nuclear power plant (which is being backfitted with Westinghouse instrumentation and control systems and fuel) in accordance with NRC licensing procedures. The laboratories will also provide advice to the authority on how to write a final safety evaluation report as required under U.S. practices. This training effort, which began in May 1994, should be completed in late 1997 or early 1998. A major part of the effort is devoted to the software aspects of digital instrumentation and control systems.
The Slovak Republic. The Slovak Republic's Nuclear Regulatory Authority requested assistance in planning for decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors currently operating or awaiting decommissioning. This issue is of particular importance in view of the contamination generated by the country's A-1 gas-cooled nuclear power plant that was shut down in 1976 and is due to be decommissioned. A course on decontamination and decommissioning--including formal consultation sessions with NRC staff, site visits to U.S. facilities with decommissioning activities under way (such as Fort St. Vrain), training sessions for technology transfer, and discussion of lessons learned from U.S. experience with plant decontamination and decommissioning--was held in January.
The authority also requested a one-week training assignment at NRC headquarters for its director and deputy director of international relations designed to expose them to NRC's approach to carrying out international obligations and other support functions. The training included meetings with officials from the Office of Public Affairs, Congressional Affairs, Division of Contracts, Office of the Controller, Office of the General Counsel, and the Technical Specifications Branch, as well as meetings with several country officers in the Office of International Programs.
The Nuclear Regulatory Authority opened its emergency operations center in May, and is now developing an efficient mode of operation and establishing written procedures. In light of this work, the authority's vice chairman asked to participate in an NRC emergency exercise. The vice chairman and two colleagues participated in an emergency exercise at the Wolf Creek nuclear power plant in Kansas in August. Technical staff from NRC's Region IV took the lead in hosting the training, escorted the Slovak visitors, and handled coordination efforts between the regional office and Wolf Creek plant staff.
The NRC also arranged a two-week management assessment and training course in March in Bratislava. The purpose of the course was to help the Nuclear Regulatory Authority acquire Western management and communication tools and skills to supplant the less efficient management style and techniques of the previous communist-era regime. The new skills should allow staff to cope with increased work loads and decentralized decision-making requirements resulting from the absorption and application of Western nuclear safety concepts. A similar course, taught in Prague in October 1994, was well received by the Czech participants.
Hungary. Dr. Lajos Voross, chief inspector at the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission, came to the NRC under a three-week mini-fellowship for senior managers. He spent two weeks at NRC headquarters, and one week in Region IV. During this time, he learned about such subjects as NRC management techniques, organization issues and program tracking procedures.
Lithuania. Two senior NRC attorneys visited Lithuania in May to meet with representatives of the Lithuanian Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss legal issues associated with VATESI's regulatory activities. In addition, the NRC attorneys met with members of the Lithuanian Parliament and the director of the parliamentary legal staff to discuss key aspects of a law on nuclear energy that Lithuania is drafting.
The NRC also contracted with Scientech Inc. to help VATESI in developing new Lithuanian safety norms and standards, preparing an Ignalina-specific inspection guidance manual, and developing an Ignalina systematic evaluation program.
December 1995
