Type: VVER-1000
Units: Two (a third unit is under construction)
Total megawatts (net): 1,900 (950 per unit)
Location: Tver, Volga (Russian Federation)
Dates of initial operation:
For an overview of the principal strengths and deficiencies of Soviet-designed plants, see Soviet Nuclear Power Plant Designs.
According to Kalinin management, some 40 improvements to safety and reliability have been made at the plant since it began operating, including the replacement of half-length control rods by full-length control rods and the modification of steam generator blowdown.
A team of experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency that visited the plant in July 1994 reported two operational events classified as Level 2 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES); both occurred in 1990.
The two units had an average availability factor of 68 percent for the first six months of 1994, and an average availability factor of 70 percent for the period 1989-1993.
Kalinin management has announced preparations for replacing the plant's steam generators and has expressed interest in obtaining a steam generator tube inspection/repair manipulator from the French company Framatome.
Under a contract signed with Framatome in September 1991, Kalinin will receive a machine to remove bolts on steam generator manhole covers.
The Russian government had planned to complete Kalinin's third unit--a VVER-1000--in 1996, but in early 1995 a Rosenergoatom official said that a lack of funds was preventing its completion. He added that Russia was trying to obtain $200 million in funding from several Italian banks and the U.S. company Westinghouse. Construction on a fourth unit at the site has been halted. In December 1995, an official of Rosenergoatom reportedly said that funding might be available to allow Kalinin 3 to be completed by 2000. Germany's Siemens is to supply some equipment for the unit, including electrical and instrumentation and control equipment, diagnostic systems, hydrogen removal systems and in-service inspection equipment.
International activities involving the Kalinin plant have included:
U.S. Assistance. A U.S. team from the U.S./Soviet Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety Working Group 9, which targets plant-diagnostic tools, has visited the plant.
In March 1992, Simulation, Systems and Services Technologies Co. (S3 Technologies) began work to support the development of a training simulator for the Kalinin site.
Whittaker Electronic Resources plans to install upgraded insulated cabling at Kalinin.
WANO Exchange Visits. Under the auspices of the World Association of Nuclear Operators, the staffs of the Kalinin plant and Pennsylvania Power & Light's Susquehanna nuclear power plant have visited each others' plant. In addition, Kalinin has hosted personnel from the following plant:
United States' Shearon Harris plant (February 1993).
Personnel from Kalinin have visited the following plant:
United States' Shearon Harris plant (March 1992, August 1994, October 1995).
Plant Twinning. The Kalinin plant is twinned with Germany's Brokdorf plant.
IAEA Training Seminar. An International Atomic Energy Agency training seminar was held at the Kalinin plant Feb. 15-17, 1994. The purpose of the seminar was to train operators and regulators in the use of the ASSET--Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team--methodology to identify safety issues, assess their consequences, and eliminate the root causes of likely future incidents and accidents. An IAEA seminar demonstrating the practical use of ASSET analysis procedures will be held at the plant March 18-20, 1997.
ASSET Mission. An ASSET mission from the IAEA visited the Kalinin plant July 4-15, 1994. The team reviewed 221 events that had occurred at the plant over the past 10 reactor years of operation. Of these events, 122 were relevant to safety and 11 exceeded the INES threshold--two were classified as Level 2 on the INES and nine were classified as Level 1.
The team was satisfied with the appropriateness of most of the corrective actions implemented by the plant, but identified pending safety problems in two areas--control of reactivity and cooling of fuel--attributed to five factors:
According to the team, these problems are related to a degradation of the plant's defense in depth, but have not resulted in any measurable on-site or off-site safety consequences to date. However, the problems have potential consequences for both plant safety and reliability. They have affected two performance indicators for reliability--unplanned shutdowns and plant availability factor. According to the ASSET mission, both of these indicators showed slight negative trends for 1993 and 1994.
The most important pending safety problem is that of control rod insertion time, which exceeds the limit prescribed in the technical specifications. Similar problems have been identified at other VVER-1000 plants. Kalinin has taken appropriate measures and long-term corrective actions are being determined at the national level. A second safety problem--reliability of sealing of ECCS pumps--will probably be eliminated soon, as new design seals have been satisfactorily tested and ordered for replacement.
The other three pending problems--reliability of I&C equipment, quality verification of maintenance work, and reliability of operators' actions--have been analyzed by plant management but are not yet under satisfactory control.
The team offered an action plan to enhance incident prevention. The plan included recommendations for systematic and independent verification of the quality of maintenance work, the extension of the plant surveillance program to include closer monitoring of the operability of I&C and electrical equipment, and the enhancement of the plant's feedback program.
The team recommended a follow-up ASSET mission in two years.
Planned ASSET Mission. An ASSET peer review mission to Kalinin is scheduled for Sept. 1-5, 1997. The mission will review the plant's analysis--using ASSET methodology--of 12 events that reflect safety culture issues.
December 1995
