Type: RBMK-1000
Units: Four
Total megawatts (net): 3,700 (925 per unit)
Location: Kursk (Russian Federation)
Dates of initial operation:
For an overview of the principal strengths and deficiencies of Soviet-designed plants, see Soviet Nuclear Power Plant Designs.
In January 1993, a pipe broke in Unit 3, dispersing a radioactive aerosol within the plant. The event was classified as Level 1 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). Unit 2 was closed in March 1993 after a short circuit occurred during routine maintenance.
In November 1995, two employees at Unit 4 received radiation doses above the permitted annual limit when they were extracting a fuel assembly from a fuel channel after a plug in a fuel rod had ruptured. The incident was classified as Level 2 on the INES.
In 1991, Unit 1's lifetime average capacity factor was 72 percent, that of both Unit 2 and Unit 3 was 71 percent and Unit 4's was 78 percent. In March 1994, however, the plant was reportedly operating at only about 50-percent capacity because of a shortage of nuclear fuel.
Upgrades similar to those completed on Leningrad (Sosnovyy Bor) Unit 1 began on Kursk Unit 1 in 1993. The upgrades involved the replacement of 1,600 pressure tubes. Replacement is complete at Unit 1 and has begun at Unit 2. Additional backfit plans include seismic upgrades, as well as improved fire protection, diagnostic systems, and instrumentation and control systems for both units 1 and 2.
In May 1992, Minatom announced the oldest two Kursk units would probably be the first RBMKs in Russia to be decommissioned for safety reasons.
Kursk Unit 5--which was 60-percent complete at the time of the Chernobyl accident--was scheduled to be completed in 1995, but early in the year a Rosenergoatom official said that a lack of funds was preventing its completion.
U.S. Aid. Under the U.S. International Nuclear Safety Program, the Kursk plant received worker protective clothing for high-temperature environments, and ultrasonic inspection equipment for RBMK primary systems.
WANO Exchange Visits. The World Association of Nuclear Operators has sponsored several exchange visits involving Kursk. The plant has hosted personnel from the following plants:
In addition, personnel from Kursk have visited the following plants:
Spent Fuel Facility. Rosenergoatom--the Russian nuclear operating organization--awarded a contract in 1994 to the French company SGN/Reseau Eurisys to build a spent fuel dry storage facility at Kursk. The facility will be capable of storing 8,000 metric tons of spent fuel. However, the contract was subsequently canceled.
In December 1995, the German company Gesellschaft für Nuklear-Behälter announced that it had signed a contract to build a radioactive waste storage facility at the plant and to supply up to 240 specially built containers. The first containers will be built in Germany, with manufacturing later transferred to Russia. The company will control production quality, train specialists and provide know-how for container production.
Plant Twinning. The Kursk plant is twinned with Germany's Mühlheim-Kärlich plant and the Susquehanna plant in the United States.
IAEA Training Seminar. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency is known for its inspection missions--including its Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team (ASSET) missions --to nuclear power plants, the agency also conducts ASSET training seminars at a country's request. The seminars are designed to train operators and regulators in the use of the ASSET methodology to identify safety issues, to assess their consequences, and to eliminate the root causes of likely future accidents and incidents.
An IAEA seminar demonstrating the practical use of ASSET analysis procedures for assessment by plant personnel of operational events was held at the plant April 4-6, 1995.
ASSET Mission. In July 1992, the IAEA conducted its first ASSET mission to an RBMK at the Kursk plant. The purpose of the mission was to assess the plant's safety provisions for preventing incidents and accidents. Among the team's findings:
The plant management is highly qualified, and the operating staff dedicated and knowledgeable.
Of 153 safety-significant events over the plant's operating history, all but 21 were below the International Nuclear Event Scale, and those 21 were Level 1 events.
About 25 percent of deficiencies were detected by routine surveillance, which left significant room for improvement.
The team recommended: a better system to prevent equipment failures, stronger assurance that safety systems receive power supply, improvements in maintenance procedures, and better testing procedures for the emergency core cooling system.
The team said a follow-up ASSET mission was advisable in two to three years.
ASSET Topical Analysis Mission. An ASSET topical analysis mission visited the Kursk plant Sept. 4-13, 1995. The mission was part of the program launched by Rosenergoatom to consolidate safety culture at Russian nuclear power plants.
The aim of the mission was to identify the root causes of safety culture issues that were the cause of events between July 1992 and July 1995. The ultimate objective was to contribute to safer electricity production through improved incident prevention.
The team found that the actions taken by the plant following the first ASSET visit in July 1992 had led to visible progress in incident prevention. However, the team noted that 77 safety-relevant events had occurred since then, demonstrating the existence of plant problems that were not being addressed by management in a timely manner to prevent failures during operation.
The team selected six events reflecting safety culture issues for in-depth root-cause analyses. The events were significant because of their potential impact on the safe production of electricity. Degradations of defense in depth resulting from safety culture issues have led either to undue activation of safety functions such as reactor shutdown or to situations where safety functions, fuel cooling and confinement were only adequate.
For most of the events analyzed, the team confirmed that appropriate corrective actions had been implemented to eliminate the identified weaknesses. The team, however, recommended that:
Surveillance testing of operating and maintenance personnel proficiency with respect to vigilance, safety awareness and qualification for tasks should be developed to identify in a timely manner unforeseen degradations.
Training programs should include safety awareness as the most important aspect to be developed among workers and supervisors.
The effectiveness of the three feedback loops--to maintain effective defense-in-depth based on personnel proficiency, equipment operability, and procedure adequacy--should be assessed each year on the basis of plant safety performance.
The team concluded that safety culture at Kursk is developing at a reasonable pace, but noted that there is still room for improvement in specific areas as highlighted by the root cause analyses. The team suggested that the plant annually conduct its own analysis of performance using ASSET procedures, and produce its own ASSET reports for peer review every two to three years by an international ASSET team.
December 1995
