With a total net nuclear energy capacity of more than 20,000 megawatts, Russia is the largest producer of nuclear-generated electricity among the three former Soviet republics with operating plants.
Currently, 29 nuclear units generate 11.5 percent of the Russian Federation's power. These plants generated 97.8 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity in 1994, and output for 1995 was 99.3 billion kilowatt-hours. Certain regions of the republic are heavily dependent on nuclear power. The Leningrad (Sosnovyy Bor), Kola and Smolensk nuclear plants supply half of northwest Russia's electricity requirements. In Central Russia, almost one-quarter of the area's power is nuclear generated.
In addition to nuclear power, Russia generates 70 percent of its electricity at thermal power stations (coal, gas and oil) and 18 percent at hydroelectric stations.
Total overall electricity production in Russia has been falling for several years. In 1993, output was down by 7 percent; thermal power accounted for most of the decline, while nuclear generation slid less than 1 percent. In 1994, output was down by 13 percent, but nuclear production slid by 18 percent. In 1995, total electricity output was down by 2 percent, with nuclear production up by about 1 percent.
Since the Soviet Union collapsed, the Russian Federation has grappled with the challenge of maintaining older-model plants and continuing its plans for building newer models.
Operating Performance. In 1992, Russian VVER reactors had an average capacity factor of 69.4 percent, while the country's RBMK reactors had an average capacity factor of 65.7 percent. But by November 1994, the VVER average had fallen to 33.6 percent and the average for Russia's RBMKs--plus the BN-600 fast breeder reactor--had slid to 49.6 percent. The decline occurred because the plants were not always paid for the electricity they generated. The resultant cash shortages affected everything from fuel supply to maintenance and repair work.
With respect to plant performance, Russian reactors had a total of nine scrams--unplanned shutdowns--for the first nine months of 1994, compared with 19 scrams for the same period in 1993. The scram rate per unit for the first nine months of 1994 was 0.31, down from 0.68 for the same period in 1993.
Initial Plan for New Capacity. In a statement issued Dec. 28, 1992, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin announced the republic's 20-year nuclear plant construction plan. The objective was to add approximately 16,500 megawatts of nuclear capacity by 2015, of which 2,000 megawatts were for heating only.
Following the Chernobyl accident, all nuclear plant construction had been suspended. The new Russian plan revived construction on five new units, including a VVER-1000 unit at Balakovo and one at Kalinin, and an RBMK unit at Kursk. Balakovo 4 came on line in April 1993.
According to a resolution of Dec. 28, 1992, the Russian government stipulated that new plant construction is dependent on approval by the "State ecological expertise committee" and review by local and regional officials and the public.
Under the 1992 plan, projects for the next phase of plant construction included:
-Two enhanced-safety VVER-1000 units at Novovoronezh to go into operation
between 2001 and 2005,
-Three 630-megawatt enhanced-safety VVER units at Kola to be completed by
2010,
-Two enhanced-safety VVER-1000 units at Balakovo,
-Two 500-megawatt district heating units at Voronezh,
-Three 800-megawatt fast breeder reactors at South Urals,
-One 800-megawatt fast breeder at Beloyarsk, and
-Two 1000-megawatt VVERs or MKERs at Leningrad.
Cancellation of Plan. In November 1993, Russia's Supreme Soviet--the parliamentary upper house--canceled the 20-year plan announced in late 1992. According to an official of Gosatomnadzor, the Russian regulatory agency, construction of Kursk Unit 5 and Kalinin Unit 3 was stalled because of lack of funding.
New Nuclear Strategy. In May 1994, the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) issued a draft strategy for nuclear energy through the year 2010 that sought to carry out the original 1992 plan. The strategy identified several new-generation reactors being designed in Russia:
According to a Rosenergoatom official, Sosnovyy Bor has been chosen as the site for the first NP-500, Novovoronezh for the first NP-1000 or NP-1100, and the Primorskaya and Kostroma sites for the first VPBERs. Design work on the NP-500 was completed in 1993, while design work on the NP-1000 and VPBER-600 was expected to be completed by the end of 1994, and on the NP-1100 in 1997.
In late 1993, the Chelyabinsk local council approved a project to build three BN-800 units at the South Urals site. The project, shelved in 1987 because of local opposition, was revived because of electricity shortages, but construction has not been resumed because of a lack of funding.
According to an official of Russia's Murmansk region, the NP-500 will also be built at the Kola site. Plans call for the first of three units to come on line in 2003, when the first two units of the existing plant--which are VVER-440 Model V230s--will be decommissioned.
In May 1995, President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on Russia's long-term energy priorities to 2010 that included provisions for a new generation of nuclear power plants. Yeltsin's Council for Scientific and Technical Policy approved in the summer of 1995 a project for building underground nuclear power plants in remote regions of Russia.
Revised Construction Program. In December 1995, a Minatom spokesman discussed the status of Russian plants under construction and planned. He said that completion of the new VVER-640 reactor could be delayed by several years because of financial difficulties. The first 640-megawatt VVER, planned for construction at a site adjacent to the Leningrad plant at Sosnovyy Bor, was originally scheduled to come on line in 1999, but Minatom now expects start-up in 2002. If this pilot project is successful, three VVER-640s may be built at the Kola plant site to provide replacement power when Kola units 1 and 2, two VVER-440 Model V230s, are shut down.
The director of the Leningrad plant reportedly wants to build the MKER-800, an advanced channel-type reactor, as a replacement for units 1 and 2, the two oldest RBMKs at the plant, sometime after 2000. But Rosenergoatom officials have reportedly said that the decision on reactor type will be made by local authorities, who will choose among the VVER-640, the VVER-1000 and the MKER-800.
Of the VVER-1000 units earmarked for completion under the 1992 Russian plan, Kalinin 3--originally scheduled to come on line in 1995--will now reportedly be operational by the end of 1996. The status of two other VVER-1000 units--Balakovo 5 and 6--is uncertain; according to a plant official, the country's new nuclear energy law requires the construction procedure to begin again, with the involvement of local and regional authorities. According to the Minatom spokesman, Rostov 1 is 90 percent complete and will be finished by the year 2000. Rostov 2 is 40 percent complete, and will be finished soon after Rostov 1.
Two new reactors, either VVER-1000s or VVER-640s, will be built at Novovoronezh, but not until sometime after 2000. Two BN-800s--rather than the three originally planned--are now scheduled for construction at the South Urals site, but not until sometime after the year 2000.
At the Kursk RBMK plant, where Unit 5 was originally scheduled to come on line in 1995, an MKER-800 is now planned for construction.
Nuclear Electricity Generation. Rosenergoatom is responsible for operating all of Russia's nuclear power plants but the Leningrad nuclear plant at Sosnovyy Bor. The Leningrad plant has the status of a separate operating utility. Both are also responsible for plant maintenance and repair, technical support, operations planning and emergency planning. In addition, Rosenergoatom is responsible for training operators and maintenance personnel, using VVER-440 and VVER-1000 simulators at Novovoronezh and an RBMK simulator at Smolensk.
Rosenergoatom maintains a centralized system in Moscow that collects, processes and disseminates information on operational events. It also reports any event to the International Atomic Energy Agency for a rating on the International Nuclear Event Scale.
The Russian nuclear plants use the information from Rosenergoatom in making equipment modifications as well as in personnel training.
Organizationally, Rosenergoatom is part of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, and its activities are overseen by Deputy Minister Viktor Sidorenko.
Non-Nuclear Electricity Generation. Russia's Ministry of Fuel and Power is responsible for formulating electricity policy and supervising electricity generation at Russia's thermal and hydro power plants.
Electricity Distribution and Sale. The Russian Joint Stock Company for the United Power System (RAO-EES), successor to the Unified Power System in the former Soviet Union, distributes and sells electricity in Russia. It owns the biggest thermal and hydro plants in the country--representing about half of Russia's non-nuclear electricity generating capacity--as well as all the high-voltage transmission lines of more than 300 kV in Russia.
|
Reactor Type |
Unit Name |
Operating Target Dates |
|
VVER-1000 |
Kalinin 3 |
1996 |
|
RBMK-1000 |
Kursk 5 |
1996 |
|
Graphite Light |
Bilibino 5 |
2002 |
|
VVER-1000 |
2002 | |
|
VVER-640 |
2003 | |
|
VVER-1000 |
2005 | |
|
District Heating |
Voronezh 1 |
1997 |
|
BN-800 |
South Urals 1 |
2000 |
|
VPBER-600 |
Far East 1 |
2005 |
|
District Heating |
Khabarovsk 1 |
2004 |
|
Pilot VVER-640 |
Sosnovyy Bor |
1999 |
Sources: Nucleonics Week, Jan. 21, 1993; Izvestiya, Feb. 6, 1993; UI Briefing, No. 93/3; Yegveniy Ignatenko presentation to ANS Second Workshop on the Safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants, Nov. 12, 1994.
The remaining large thermal and hydro plants--those over 1,000 megawatts--are owned by 21 individual utility companies. The rest of Russia's thermal and hydro capacity--about 65 percent of the country's total installed capacity--is owned by 65 local power companies. Some of these companies, in turn, are owned by RAO-EES. The Russian government owns 51 percent of RAO-EES, with the remainder of the company held privately.
RAO-EES controls the wholesale electricity market, buying all the output of the 21 individual utility companies and most of Rosenergoatom's output. Some of Russia's nuclear power plants have attempted to bypass RAO-EES, seeking to negotiate power supply agreements directly with regional and local power systems not wholly owned by RAO-EES. But RAO-EES has blocked such attempts.
In the fall of 1995, the government froze all prices for electricity, as well as for natural gas and railroad shipping, between Oct. 1 and Jan. 1, 1996, in an effort to curb inflation. The Economics Ministry has reportedly proposed a 16 percent increase in electricity prices, to take effect on or after Feb. 15, 1996.
Gosatomnadzor (GAN)--the State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety--is responsible for regulatory oversight of Russia's civilian nuclear power plants. In July 1995, President Yeltsin issued a directive stating that GAN would be responsible for oversight of civilian facilities only; the Ministry of Defense is to have responsibility for all military nuclear facilities.
GAN, which is headed by Yuriy Vishnevskiy, reports directly to President Yeltsin. GAN licenses all civilian facilities that use radioactive materials, develops rules and standards governing the safe use of these materials, and inspects all facilities that use these materials, including nuclear power plants. GAN is also charged with approving the design and construction of all nuclear plants.
The agency sets the skill requirements of all personnel responsible for the safe operation of nuclear plants, and ensures that those requirements are met. GAN is responsible for analyzing all nuclear plant incidents and recommending any necessary corrective measures. It also provides information on events that must be reported outside the plant. GAN has the authority to shut down or withdraw the operating license of any facility that violates its nuclear safety requirements.
In addition to its headquarters in Moscow, GAN has seven regional branches: St. Petersburg, Balakovo, Yekaterinburg, Khabarovsk, Moscow, Novovoronezh and Novosibirsk. There is at least one resident inspector at almost all of Russia's nuclear plants.
At present, Russia's nuclear plants operate on the basis of temporary permits, but the permits do include requirements on improvement programs and independent assessments. According to GAN officials, the agency plans to develop a full-scope licensing regime based on that used in the United States.
Since the beginning of 1993, Russia's nuclear plants have failed to receive full payment for the electricity they supply to RAO-EES. According to Rosenergoatom, it is being paid for only about a third of the nuclear electricity used in the country. RAO-EES is delaying--or failing to make--payments to Rosenergoatom because it is not being paid by Russia's electricity consumers. As a result, many of Russia's nuclear plants have been unable to pay their staff or purchase needed fuel and spare parts.
During the winter of 1994, the directors of a number of Russian nuclear plants--among them Sosnovyy Bor, Smolensk, Kursk, Novovoronezh and Kola--said they might have to shut down if they did not get money for fuel and spare parts. In the spring, workers from nine nuclear plants demonstrated in Moscow to demand that they be paid. By law, nuclear plant workers are forbidden to strike.
The government responded by approving 50 billion rubles in emergency credit. As of mid-June, however, the money had not been transferred to the Ministry of Atomic Energy, and Rosenergoatom reported that maintenance had been suspended at many plants.
In late July, workers at the Smolensk and Kola plants staged protests over salary arrears, refusing to leave their plants. The trade union representing the country's nuclear workers also appealed to President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin for emergency measures to end the payment crisis.
Yuriy Vishnevskiy, head of GAN--Russia's regulatory agency--said in August that the agency would order the shutdown of a nuclear plant, even in winter, if staff morale or delayed repairs threatened the plant's safety. Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhaylov called a meeting of Russia's nuclear plant managers at Smolensk in mid-August. Mikhaylov and the head of the nuclear workers trade union appealed to the country's president and premier, noting that the plants were having difficulty preparing for the coming winter season.
In November 1994, the Russian government adopted a resolution on preparing for the winter season, which included a settlement of debts in the nuclear power industry. The resolution instructed the Russian Ministry of Finance to pay off the debts of nuclear power plants with promissory notes. Thirty percent of the notes were to be handed over to Rosenergoatom. In addition, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed a decree in mid-November instructing the Ministry of Finance to defer payment of the taxes owed by the country's nuclear power plants for the second half of 1994.
The same month, Russia's economics minister suggested that a 10 percent excise tax be levied on natural gas, with the tax money going to the nuclear energy and mining industries.
By the end of 1994, Rosenergoatom was reportedly owed 1.6 trillion rubles by RAO-EES, and Rosenergoatom itself owed 1.45 trillion rubles to other organizations. Nuclear plants received only 20-30 percent of what they were owed in 1994. In some cases, plants set up barter arrangements with consumer enterprises. Kursk plant, for example, received wheat and sunflower oil in partial payment for electricity produced. As a result of such barter arrangements, however, scheduled reactor repairs were postponed and outages lengthened because spare parts could not be obtained.
In April 1995, Rosenergoatom head Erik Pozdyshev said that the organization was solving payment problems through a combination of barter, government intervention and subsidies. In October, however, repair work and preparation for the winter season were reportedly two months behind schedule. In addition, nuclear plant personnel had not been paid yet for work in August. Debts to Rosenergoatom continued to rise, with nuclear electricity consumers owing 2.1 trillion rubles.
In September 1995, the Kola nuclear power plant cut off power to the nuclear submarine base of the Russian Northern Fleet because the base had not paid its electricity bills. As a result of this and other similar incidents at Russian military bases, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed an order in late September prohibiting regional power systems from cutting off electricity to military installations. In November, the Russian government adopted a resolution--effective until May 15, 1996--prohibiting the disconnection of electricity, gas, heat or other fuel supplies to the country's most important facilities, including those belonging to the Ministry of Defense. Later that month, Russia's parliament submitted a law to President Yeltsin that would make it a crime to cut off electricity supplies to military facilities.
In November 1995, the head of the Russian trade union for nuclear power plant workers--Vladimir Startsev--threatened to shut down some of the country's reactors unless plant personnel received the back pay owed them. He said that warning protests would be held at the plants beginning Nov. 30. According to Startsev, a resolution issued by the government in October had reduced the amount of revenue a plant could keep from 50 percent to 10 percent, leaving it with too little money to pay wages.
In an attempt to improve the plants' financial situation, the Russian government decreed that effective Jan. 1, 1996, all enterprises must pay for electricity consumed, and nuclear power plants will be taxed on the basis of revenue received, not electricity produced.
The Russian Federation has drafted nuclear energy legislation that includes some of the provisions of the Vienna Convention, and it had a second reading in the Duma--Russia's lower house--in February 1995. In early June, the Duma approved the nuclear law, which includes a provision on nuclear liability.
Russia's upper house--the Federation Council--approved the law in mid-June, but in August President Yeltsin's office rejected the law because of judicial discrepancies, sending it back to the Duma for reconsideration. In late October, the Duma again approved the law, noting that it had taken into consideration Yeltsin's remarks and suggestions. President Yeltsin signed the law in November 1995.
Under the law, the nuclear power plant operating organization is responsible for any damage caused by an accident at the plant. The type and limits of liability of the operating organization will be spelled out in separate legislation. According to the law, the maximum amount of liability in any single incident is not to exceed the amount specified in Russia's international treaties.
Russia is not a party to the Vienna Convention, which ensures that the responsibility for damage caused by a nuclear accident is channeled to the plant operator. Nor is it a party to the 1988 Joint Protocol on Civil Law Liability and Compensation for Cross-Boundary Damage from Nuclear Accident, which resolves potential conflicts between the Paris Convention--which covers 14 European countries--and the Vienna Convention--which has worldwide coverage.
However, in late 1993, Russia signed an agreement with the U.S. government that covered nuclear safety assistance activities and the provision of liability protection. The Russian government agreed to indemnify all U.S. government contractors working on safety-related improvements at Russian nuclear power plants.
Russia and the European Commission signed a memorandum of understanding on Feb. 27, 1995, that provides indemnity from nuclear liability for Western companies working on safety-related projects at Russian nuclear plants under the European Union's TACIS program.
Russia and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in June 1995 concluded an indemnity agreement for work done under contract at the Kola, Novovoronezh and Leningrad plants that is being funded by the EBRD's Nuclear Safety Account. President Yeltsin issued a decree in August putting the agreement into effect.
Russia and Germany have been working since late 1994 on a bilateral indemnity agreement that would protect German companies supplying equipment to Russian nuclear plants.
Supply of Fuel. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, some sectors of the nuclear fuel production complex were left outside Russia. Most of the dioxide pellets for fuel assemblies, for instance, are made in Kazakhstan, and Ukraine supplies zirconium for fuel rods. Russia has extensive uranium resources, but it has only one operating uranium processing facility. The country has four uranium enrichment plants and two major fuel fabrication facilities, the Elektrostal complex near Moscow and a plant in Novosibirsk. Fuel for VVER-440, RBMK, BN (fast breeder) and GBWR (Bilibino) reactors is produced at Elektrostal, and VVER-1000 fuel at Novosibirsk.
The Ulbinskiy plant in Kazakhstan produces fuel pellets for VVER-1000 and RBMK reactors, which are sent to Novosibirsk and Elektrostal, respectively, for insertion in fuel assemblies.
The fuel production cycle has been disrupted, however, by the inability of many Russian nuclear plants to pay for fuel. The Novosibirsk plant, for instance, was owed more than 70 billion rubles by plants in Russia and Ukraine in April 1994. As a result, it was unable to buy equipment and material needed for fuel production.
With some Russian nuclear plants--especially RBMKs--facing shutdown because of low fuel stocks, the Russian government decided in April 1994 to give the plants special credits to buy fuel.
According to a Russian news agency report in January 1995, Russian fuel manufacturers have been paid for only about 3-5 percent of the cost of fuel produced; they are reportedly owed 300 billion rubles by Russian nuclear plants
The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy is responsible for operating the country's nuclear fuel facilities.
Spent Fuel Storage and Disposal. The Ministry of Atomic Energy is also solely responsible for handling spent fuel from Russia's nuclear plants. Spent fuel from the country's VVER-440 reactors and its breeder reactor is sent to RT-1, a reprocessing plant in Chelyabinsk. The recycled uranium is used to produce fuel for RBMK reactors. Spent fuel from VVER-1000 plants is stored either at the plant sites or at a facility near Krasnoyarsk. Even if VVER-1000 plants increase their on-site storage capacity for spent fuel, the Krasnoyarsk facility will be full by 2010.
In May 1994, the Russian government issued a decree on an environmental protection action plan for 1994-1995 that prohibited the import of radioactive waste. By defining spent fuel as a raw material, however, Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy has continued to accept spent fuel from other countries.
A reprocessing plant for VVER-1000 spent fuel, known as RT-2, is under construction at the site, but work has been delayed because of funding difficulties, and the facility is only about 25 percent complete. In September 1995, the Russian government approved new rules on reprocessing that would allow spent fuel from foreign reactors to be stored at Krasnoyarsk until RT-2 is completed. Fees from such storage could be used for the construction of RT-2. However, local opposition to the import of foreign fuel, on the grounds that it violates Russian law, reportedly led to a collapse of talks with Germany and Switzerland on the shipment of spent fuel to Krasnoyarsk. RT-2 may thus not be operational by its target date of 2005.
Spent fuel from Russia's RBMKs is not reprocessed because it is considered too expensive to do so. Instead, the spent fuel is stored at the plant sites. Construction of a centralized long-term dry storage facility for spent RBMK fuel was planned, but has reportedly been postponed. As a result, on-site storage at RBMK plants is being expanded. The French company SGN/Reseau Aursys has been awarded a contract to build storage facilities at the Kursk and Smolensk plants.
According to the Ministry of Atomic Energy, Russia's nuclear plants have sufficient on-site storage for 10 more years of operation. The ministry is said to be considering the possibility of using deep underground caverns near Chelyabinsk as a final repository for spent fuel.
In addition to reprocessing spent fuel from its own VVER-440 reactors, Russia has accepted spent fuel from VVER-440 reactors in Eastern Europe for reprocessing. But in June 1994, the lower house of Russia's parliament--the Duma--approved a draft law on handling radioactive waste that prohibited the import of nuclear waste into Russia. In November, the Duma reversed its position and, unable to support a complete ban on imported spent fuel, sent the draft law back to a parliamentary committee for revision.
In September 1995, the Russian government issued a decree stating that all radioactive waste received by Russia must be returned to its country of origin after 20 years. Under this decree, countries shipping spent fuel to Russia would--after 20 years--presumably either have to take back the fuel if Russia were unable to reprocess it, or accept the waste if Russia did reprocess the spent fuel.
The country's new law on nuclear energy, signed by President Yeltsin in November 1995, codifies the Ministry of Atomic Energy's current practice of circumventing existing environmental legislation by defining spent fuel as a raw material. In late 1995, both houses of Russia's Parliament approved a law on radioactive waste that would ban the import of spent fuel by defining it as waste, not a raw material. But according to a report by Russian news agency ITAR-TASS in late December 1995, the bill was vetoed by President Yeltsin on the grounds that it contradicted the Russian constitution and statutes. Yeltsin reportedly pointed out in a letter to the Duma that the version submitted to him differed from that passed by the Duma.
According to Rosenergoatom, IAEA-recommended safety improvements are being made to--or planned for--the first-generation RBMKs and VVER-440 Model V230s. Kursk Unit 1 was shut down in April 1994 for upgrading; it is expected to come back on line in spring 1995, when Unit 2 will be shut down for upgrading. Upgrading of Sosnovyy Bor units 1 and 2 has been completed. Principal funding for the improvements made to these RBMK units has come from the European Union's TACIS (Technical Assistance to the CIS) program and the G-24 nations. Novovoronezh units 3 and 4 and Kola units 1 and 2 are also earmarked for upgrading. During 1992 and 1993, Russia spent about $105 million on safety projects at its nuclear plants, according to Atomic Energy Minister Mikhaylov.
Moscow WANO Center. The Moscow Center of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) continues to provide reports on plant operational events to the association. WANO-sponsored exchange visits also have continued.
IAEA Training Seminars. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency is known for its inspection missions--including its Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team (ASSET) missions--to nuclear power plants, the agency also conducts ASSET training seminars at a country's request. The seminars are designed to train operators and regulators in the use of the ASSET methodology to identify safety issues, to assess their consequences and to eliminate the root causes of likely future accidents and incidents.
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry requested an ASSET seminar. The seminar, held Oct. 14-18, 1991, in Kiev, was attended by 33 people representing 14 Soviet nuclear power plants, MAPI, the Soviet regulatory body and nuclear power research centers. Included in the seminar was a discussion of the compatibility of the ASSET methodology and the recently adopted U.S.S.R. regulations on investigating operational events. In addition, ASSET training missions visited the Balakovo plant (Aug. 30-Sept. 3, 1993), the Kalinin plant (Feb. 15-17, 1994) and the Smolensk plant (June 6-10, 1994).
U.S. Assistance Program. Under this program, the U.S. government is helping to improve the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear plants in Russia as well as Ukraine and Eastern and Central Europe. The program covers operational safety improvements, risk reduction and regulatory assistance (see the sections on NRC Programs, DOE Programs).
European Union Assistance. Under its TACIS program, the EU has funded projects involving safety systems upgrade work, waste management, emergency procedures, measurement technology and training at VVER plants in Russia and Ukraine. Projects that have been completed include: providing a data package and set of description systems for developing a VVER-440 Model V230 simulator; providing training procedures and materials for VVER-440 Model V230 staff; and developing a methodology for drafting, checking, reviewing, validating and using all operating procedures. (For details of this assistance, see the International Assistance section.)
EBRD Nuclear Safety Account. In June 1995, Russia agreed to accept grants totaling 76 million ECU ($95.7 million) from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's Nuclear Safety Account for upgrades at three plants: Leningrad, Novovoronezh and Kola. In accepting the grants, Russia agreed to several conditions, including an assessment of the need for continued operation of the first generation VVER-440 Model V230 and RBMK reactors at these sites.
Of the total grants, 30.6 million ECU ($38.58 million) are earmarked for the Leningrad plant, which has four RBMK reactors. Projects are expected to include inspection and monitoring, non-destructive examination, fire protection, and components for emergency core cooling system upgrades. A grant of 44.9 ECU ($55.6 million) are designated to Rosenergoatom for joint projects at the Kola plant, with four reactors, two of them Model V230s, and the Novovoronezh plant, with three reactors, two of them Model V230s. Activities at these plants are expected to include inspection and monitoring, replacement valves, and fire and radiation protection. All projects are slated for completion by the end of 1997.
In addition, the regulatory authority GAN will receive 0.9 million ECU ($1.1 million) to use in establishing a full licensing regime for Russia's least safe reactors, the RBMKs and VVER-440 Model V230s. The grant agreement stipulates that the new system be used to evaluate whether these plants should be shut down or permitted to operate for a limited period. A consortium of experts from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia and the United States has been awarded a 900,000 ECU ($1.13 million) contract to evaluate the safety of Russia's eight oldest reactors--Leningrad units 1-4, Kola units 1-2 and Novovoronezh units 3-4.
Joint Japanese and Russian Efforts. As part of its effort to support improvements in Russian plant operations under the G-7 agreement, Japan has entered a joint program with Russian counterparts to develop a warning system for leaks in piping.
Canadian Support. In May 1992, Canada signed a memorandum of agreement with Russia. The agreement allows Canada to assist with a full range of nuclear technology-related projects, including RBMKs, fuel cycle efforts, nuclear heating units, waste technology and decommissioning. Nuclear applications in medicine and agriculture are also included. In June 1992, Canada announced it would commit $30 million (US $21.9 million) for a nuclear safety initiative aimed at improving Russian plant safety. In early 1993, Canada announced that it would establish the Canada-Russia Nuclear Safety and Engineering Center, with offices in Moscow and Sosnovyy Bor, near the Leningrad plant. Canada is also talking with Russia about the feasibility of building two 700-megawatt CANDU reactors near Vladivostok in eastern Siberia.
Leningrad PSA Project. Based on the work done for the Barselina project at Lithuania's Ignalina 2, Western experts have talked with officials from Russia's Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering--the design institute for RBMKs--and the Leningrad plant about carrying out a similar probabilistic safety analysis at Unit 2 of the Russian plant. The two sides are still negotiating with Russia over how to pay for the project.
Nuclear Incident Exercises. In May 1995, Russia conducted an exercise to test the readiness of its agencies responsible for transmitting information on nuclear incidents and accidents. For the exercise, Russian authorities simulated a severe loss-of-coolant accident at the Kola nuclear power plant. The exercise, held in the Murmansk region, involved observers and participants from several countries and international organizations. According to the participants, the exercise demonstrated that surrounding populations could be evacuated in the event of an accident, and that alternative communications could be established to ensure that information was available after an accident.
In December 1995, Russian emergency workers carried out an exercise at the Leningrad nuclear plant to test their ability to deal with contamination from a nuclear accident. The exercise was observed by nuclear experts from several foreign countries.
Russian-Cuban Project. In 1976, the Soviet Union and Cuba agreed to build a nuclear plant near Cienfuegos in Cuba. Construction of the Juragua plant--two VVER-440 Model V318s (a version of the Model V213 that the Soviets planned to export)--was begun in 1983 but halted in 1992 following the collapse of the Soviet Union and a lack of Cuban funding. In 1993, Russia reportedly extended a loan to Cuba to finance the maintenance of buildings and equipment at the site.
In 1995, Russia sought to revive the project. Officials of Germany's Siemens said in May that the company had been asked by Russia to supply instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment for the Cuban plant under a Russian-German joint venture set up in 1994. According to a Russian atomic energy ministry spokesman, Russia granted Cuba $30 million in credit in 1995 to purchase auxiliary equipment for the plant.
A Cuban official said in August 1995 that four Western companies had nearly completed a financial and technical feasibility study of the plant's completion. Later in the year, a Cuban deputy minister reportedly said that the study had shown the project to be viable. Civil construction of Unit 1 is estimated to be more than 90 percent complete, while Unit 2 is estimated to be 20-30 percent complete. The cost of completing Unit 1 is estimated at between $300 million and $750 million, putting the total cost of completing the plant at more than $1 billion.
Russian officials visiting Cuba in October 1995 reportedly agreed to contribute $349 million to plant construction, with Cuba providing $208 million and the remainder to be raised from other sources. A Russian atomic energy ministry official said in November 1995 that an international consortium would be established in the first quarter of 1996 to build the plant, and that construction would be resumed in the first half of 1996.
Russian-Iranian Agreement. The Ministry of Atomic Energy signed an $800 million agreement with Iran in 1995 to complete the construction of a 1,000-megawatt pressurized water reactor at Bushehr, where work was suspended by Germany in the wake of the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. According to Minatom, Russia has also proposed to build three additional reactors--a VVER-1000 and two VVER--at the Bushehr site. Russia will reportedly supply fuel for the reactors and take back spent fuel for reprocessing.
According to a Russian nuclear industry official, however, a delegation will travel to Iran in late February 1996 to decide whether it is technically and economically feasible to complete the unfinished reactor. Plans had called for equipment to be delivered to the site beginning in spring 1996 for work on the reactor, which is expected to come on line by 2000. Iran has reportedly tapped a letter of credit to begin paying for Russian help on the project.
Sino-Russian Agreement. In a memorandum of understanding signed in December 1992 by the Russian and Chinese governments, China agreed to buy two 1,000-megawatt reactors of the new VVER-91 design. With the signing of a contract between Russian and Chinese entities, Minatom expects to complete the reactors in six years. The memorandum of agreement also provides that Minatom will supply China with fuel for the reactors.
Construction will begin in 1996, with the plant coming on line in 2002. Russia will provide all major equipment with the possible exception of instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. China reportedly wants European I&C equipment. Russia has agreed to grant credits for the equipment and all training. In addition, Minatom's Mikhaylov said in December 1995 that Russia and China expected to sign a cooperative agreement on nuclear energy that included the joint development of nuclear power plants in China.
Russian-Indian Agreement. In late 1994, the Ministry of Atomic Energy agreed to build a 2,000-megawatt nuclear power plant using Russian VVER technology at Kundankulam in India. The eight-year construction project is expected to begin in 1995. Russia has agreed to accept spent fuel from the plant for reprocessing. However, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has reportedly approved the sale on the condition that India adhere to full-scope IAEA safeguards. To date, India has not done so. In October 1995, India and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding--an addendum to the 1994 agreement--on the construction of the nuclear plant. But in December 1995, Russian atomic energy ministry officials reportedly said that India no longer wanted a turnkey VVER plant and instead wanted to build the plant itself. According to the officials, Russia would not proceed with the project until it was assured that India could pay for the project.
Special British, German Projects. In December 1992, British and German government organizations initiated two projects. One is designed to assist Russian authorities in controlling nuclear materials. The second project involves the construction of radioactive waste treatment facilities at the Balakovo plant.
French-Russian Agreements. French and Russian authorities have continued to set up cooperative arrangements. One agreement between French authorities and Russia's Minatom will allow for the establishment of a series of "twinning" arrangements between Russian and French plants to promote the exchange of information on plant experience. Another agreement between Minatom and the French company Cogema allows for joint projects toward managing the nuclear fuel cycle. In March 1993, Minatom and the French Atomic Energy Commission signed an agreement that set in place the framework for cooperative work in such areas as reactor operations, the nuclear fuel cycle, plant decommissioning, safety, research, public information and training.
Franco-German Safety Office. GRS and IPSN, the German and French technical consulting bodies for nuclear safety, respectively, have formed a joint venture--Riskaudit--to support EU-funded safety-related activities. The two organizations have opened an office in Moscow for the joint venture.
Satellite Link with Nordic Countries. Satellite communications links were established to provide Finland, Sweden and Norway with information on operating events at the Leningrad (Sosnovyy Bor) plant. Plans are to link up the Kola plant as well.
Converting Fuel for Civilian Use. In early 1993, the United States and Russia reached agreement on the disposition of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Soviet nuclear weapons. Between 1994 and 1998, at least 10 metric tons of HEU will be converted annually--in Russia--to low enriched uranium, which can be sold for commercial purposes including use in nuclear power plants. After 1998, at least 30 metric tons will be converted each year. The Russian government has agreed to use some of the money earned from sales of low enriched uranium to improve the safety of its nuclear power plants. In 1994, the United States and Russia established a joint stock company, Matek, to handle the conversion.
Minatom-General Atomics Agreement. In 1993, Minatom and the U.S. company General Atomics signed a memorandum of understanding, whereby they will cooperate in designing and developing a gas-turbine modular helium reactor. In February 1995, the two sides agreed to invest $1 million each in the project.
U.S.-Russian Joint Venture. In late 1993, the U.S. company Advanced Physics Corp. announced that it had launched a joint venture with five Russian nuclear and space industry centers--led by the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute--to build a 60-megawatt high-temperature gas-cooled reactor for sale in developing countries.
Minatom-Siemens Agreement. In 1994, Minatom and Germany's Siemens set up a joint venture company to manufacture Siemens' instrumentation and control (I&C) systems for use in Russia and to design new I&C systems. In November 1995, Siemens signed a letter of intent to supply engineering services and I&C systems for a prototype 640-megawatt VVER reactor to be built at the Leningrad plant site beginning in 1997. In payment, Minatom will provide DM 15 million ($10.1 million) worth of enrichment services annually for the first five to six years of the project to the German utility Bayernwerk, which will then pay Siemens.
Russian-Czech Agreement. Russia and the Czech Republic signed an agreement in 1994 to cooperate in the field of nuclear power engineering. Under the agreement, Russia will deliver fresh fuel to the Czech Republic and will reprocess spent fuel.
Russian-Brazilian Agreement. In September 1994, Russia and Brazil agreed to cooperate in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. One area of cooperation is nuclear safety. During talks in April 1995, the two sides considered the construction of small nuclear power plants in Brazil using low-capacity Russian reactors like those used on icebreakers.
Russian-Finnish Agreement. In June 1994, Finland and Russia agreed on a new threshold for reporting nuclear incidents that is lower than the threshold contained in a 1987 agreement between Finland and the former Soviet Union.
Russian-Hungarian Agreement. In March 1995, Russia and Hungary agreed on a means of clearing the former Soviet Union's debt to Hungary that included the delivery of Russian gas or coal to Ukrainian electric power plants and the delivery of electricity from Ukraine to Hungary.
Russian-German Project. Under a joint program to monitor radiation levels around Russian nuclear plants, observation posts have been set up at the Smolensk, Kola, Bilibino and Novovoronezh plants. Equipment for similar posts has been delivered to the Balakovo, Beloyarsk, Kalinin and Kursk plants, but not yet assembled because of financing problems.
At the request of the former U.S.S.R. and subsequently the Russian Federation, the International Atomic Energy Agency has inspected operating plants and those under construction. The IAEA's missions to Balakovo, Kalinin, Kola, Novovoronezh, Smolensk and Leningrad (Sosnovyy Bor) are discussed in the separate summaries of those plants.
|
Plant |
Type/Model |
# Units |
MWe (net) |
|
VVER-1000 |
4 |
3,800 | |
|
Fast Breeder |
1 |
560 | |
|
VVER-1000 |
2 |
1,900 | |
|
VVER-440 Model V230 (two) |
4 |
1,644 | |
|
RBMK-1000 |
4 |
3,700 | |
|
Leningrad (Sosnovyy Bor) |
RBMK-1000 |
4 |
3,700 |
|
VVER-440 Model V230 (two) |
3 |
1,720 | |
|
RBMK-1000 |
3 |
2,775 | |
|
TOTAL: |
25* |
19,799 |
*In addition, the Bilibino plant, which produces both electricity and steam, has four small-scale channel-type reactors totaling 44 megawatts.
|
Sources |
"World List of Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear News, March 1995 |
|
World Nuclear Industry Handbook, 1995, Nuclear Engineering International, Sutton, Surrey, United Kingdom | |
|
The European Nuclear Society |
January 1996
