Type: RBMK
Units: Two
Total megawatts (net): 2,600
Location: Visaginas (formerly Snieckus), Lithuania
Dates of initial operation:
For an overview of the principal strengths and deficiencies of Soviet-designed plants, see Soviet Nuclear Power Plant Designs.
Swedish sources speculated that a faulty weld led to the release of contaminated water at Ignalina in January 1994, an event that forced one unit to shut down.
Lithuanian authorities reported an energy shortage later in January 1994 after operators shut down Ignalina Unit 1 following the failure of control board instrumentation. The event was classified as Level 0 on the IAEA's International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).
Cold weather in February 1994 led to the freezing of fire protection equipment. Lithuania classified the incident as Level 1 on the INES.
In February 1994, Ignalina shut down so that engineers could locate and stop leaking in certain valve compartments. Plant workers determined the source of the leaks to be damaged sealing gaskets. The incident was classified as Level 1 on the INES.
Lithuania classified an incident that occurred on July 11, 1994, as an IAEA Level 1 event. Engineers had incorrectly installed a new switch used to move control rods in and out of the reactor. Operators discovered the error when testing the new switch, which they then successfully replaced.
Ignalina Unit 2 was shut down from April 15 to July 3 in 1994 (during which time Unit 1 was on scheduled maintenance). Over this period, Lithuania received electricity from Russia as payment for previous debts.
In November 1994, authorities shut down both Ignalina units in response to a terrorist threat. Lithuania's prime minister asked Swedish authorities for help in searching the plant because they were well-acquainted with areas most vulnerable to attack.
Both units returned to service after searches revealed no bombs. Following the incident, Lithuanian authorities launched a crash program to improve plant security. Their first steps included the procurement of new equipment, such as infrared binoculars for guards. Other actions included the creation of three working groups to improve security measures. The groups include representatives from the Lithuanian police, the defense ministry, the energy ministry and the environment ministry. The groups will write bid specifications and purchase relevant equipment, train personnel in security and physical protection, write complete instructions for how to search the plant in the event of further bomb threats, and train personnel to participate in such searches. In addition, Lithuanian regulators introduced a computerized accounting system for fuel at the plant and changed personnel routines. Sweden, Finland, Germany and other observers praised the Lithuanians for their actions in response to the terrorist threat.
In August 1995, the crane loading an emergency sealing plug into a refueling machine during a routine maintenance outage became entangled with the electric feed cable of another crane, causing a cut in the power supply. The incident was provisionally classified as Level 1 on the INES.
In November 1995, fast-acting valves between the emergency core cooling pressurized tanks and the reactor at Unit 2 spontaneously opened and approximately 12 tons of water were released. An operator noticed that the valves had opened, and shut them. The incident was classified as Level 1 on the INES.
The plant has carried out numerous major upgrades since 1989, including:
Swedish Assistance. The Swedish utility Vattenfall AB began supplying Ignalina emergency gear and fire protection equipment after two divers died while working in Ignalina's inlet channels. As of November 1993, Vattenfall had supplied about $125,000 worth of equipment, including protective fire-fighting clothing and fire extinguishers. Vattenfall has also recommended that authorities arrange for more firefighters to protect the plant in an emergency. By early 1994, Vattenfall AB had completed the installation of fire protection systems.
Under a Swedish-Lithuanian agreement, a project to examine Ignalina's fuel channels was launched in 1992. Using non-destructive examination equipment developed by Sweden's ABB Tekniska Röntgencentralen, welds were examined in Unit 2 as the basis for a comprehensive examination program at Unit 1. In addition to conducting the examinations, ABB TRC will train Ignalina technicians in the use of the equipment and supply equipment for non-destructive testing. ABB TRC is providing several new manipulators for RBMKs as well as modern ultrasonic and eddy current instruments.
Other activities in Sweden's assistance program include: providing management development to help Ignalina become an independent commercial company, assessing the confinement system, and modernizing the plant's communication systems.
In November 1995, Vattenfall signed a Kr 7.8 million ($1.16 million) contract to supply fire protection equipment, including fire doors and new fire-retardant floor covering.
In December 1995, the Swedish government agreed to provide equipment to improve access control at the Ignalina plant. Among the Kr 4.5 million ($670,500) in equipment to be supplied by ABB subsidiary Trax AB are: computerized magnetic-strip ID cards, surveillance cameras, metal detectors and other security devices. In addition, the U.S. government plans to provide some assistance for the security project.
The installation of a pressure relief pipe from the confinement at Ignalina 1 is expected to take place in spring 1996. Delivery of robotic installation equipment designed and made by ABB Atom had been delayed for two years because of liability concerns.
Finnish Help. IVO International has a contract, funded by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to carry out an engineering study and deliver a computerized technical documentation management system.
German Aid. GEC Alsthom Energie has received a contract, funded by the EBRD, to supply equipment for in-service inspection of Ignalina's reactor channels. The equipment will include mechanical hardware and ultrasonic inspection equipment to examine fuel channels, control rod channels and graphite channels.
Ignalina Safety Analysis Group. The Ignalina Safety Analysis Group, a component of the country's nuclear safety structure, is devoted to analyzing Ignalina's scientific and technical aspects. The group, consisting of Lithuanian experts, seeks to:
The group is working on cooperative projects with Germany, the United States and Sweden.
The group's activities cover the following areas:
The group is also participating in the in-depth safety assessment of Ignalina funded by the EBRD's Nuclear Safety Account.
ASSET Mission. Ignalina was the focus of the first ASSET (Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team) review in the former Soviet Union by the IAEA. The IAEA team, which visited the plant Nov. 20-Dec. 1, 1989, studied plant operating history and incident-prevention programs.
The team reported that Ignalina was operated at internationally acceptable standards and that the plant was one of the world's lowest in unplanned automatic shutdowns. In both 1987 and 1988, there were 40 reported events at the plant; for the first 10 months of 1989, there were only four.
The team noted that while the plant's surveillance policy appeared to be sound, management needed to take additional measures to develop an effective plant surveillance program for prevention of incidents. Among the team's suggestions:
Management should set up a department of surveillance with the same authority as the department of operations and department of maintenance.
The department's responsibilities should include assessment of personnel proficiency, assessment of performance in areas of safety and reliability, and assessment of all operational events to ensure complete feedback.
Follow-Up ASSET Mission. A follow-up ASSET mission visited Ignalina Feb. 1-12, 1993, to review the implementation of recommendations made by the 1989 ASSET mission. The team found that most of the recommendations had been considered by plant management, which had taken steps to implement them.
The team identified a few areas where recommendations had not been implemented:
The team also found a number of good practices, many involving the creation of special groups with responsibility for specific areas, such as the maintenance and modification of cables, the collection of reliability data, and the measurement and analysis of vibration data on rotating equipment.
The team offered two suggestions:
The team also suggested a structured walkdown of the plant to remove any combustible material, especially material near cable trays and other safety-related equipment.
In addition, the team reviewed a total of 173 reported events between January 1989 and October 1992. Of these, 140 were considered to be safety relevant; three events were classified as Level 2 on the International Nuclear Event Scale, 14 were classified as Level 1 and the rest as Level 0.
The team reviewed two events in detail, and from the review developed four main recommendations:
OSART Mission. An IAEA OSART (Operational Safety Review Team) mission visited the Ignalina plant Sept. 4-22, 1995. The team noted that the plant was carrying out many initiatives, with the help of the international community, to improve safety. Among the initiatives: buying a full-scope simulator and upgrading operating procedures.
The team identified several areas of good performance:
The team also offered several proposals for improvement, including:
January 1996
