The Slovak Republic operates four VVER-440 units at Jaslovske Bohunice. Nuclear energy supplies 49 percent of all electricity generated in the country, with thermal plants accounting for 33 percent and hydro plants for 18 percent.
The Slovak Republic has four VVER-440s under construction at Mochovce. To help achieve self-sufficiency in electricity generation, the country is pressing ahead with the completion of two of the four planned Mochovce units. Unit 1 is expected to be completed in 1997, and Unit 2 in 1998.
Before the breakup of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Federal Assembly was considering a draft energy policy that would continue the country's nuclear program and reduce reliance on coal and oil in favor of natural gas and renewable energy sources.
The Slovak government continues to support the use of nuclear energy and reportedly intends to develop its own energy policy in the near future. In a policy statement in January 1995, the Slovak government stated it would ensure completion of the construction of units 1 and 2 of the Mochovce nuclear plant. The same month the Slovak Ministry of Economy issued a statement in response to criticism of the Mochovce project by Greenpeace in which it defended the completion of Mochovce 1 and 2 as the least-cost source of electricity. The ministry also stated that the country planned to complete all four units at Mochovce.
Utility Operations. Slovenske Elektrarne (SE)--formerly Slovensky Energeticky Podnik (SEP)--the Slovak utility, is responsible for electricity generation and high-voltage transmission in the Slovak Republic. Three companies are responsible for regional electricity distribution.
Before the breakup of the CSFR, SEP was state-owned, although the country planned to privatize the utility as part of its move toward a market economy. In September 1994, the Slovak government approved the privatization of SEP (now SE), but the proposed plan did not go into effect, and privatization of the utility is still under discussion.
At a news conference in Bratislava in June 1995, SE management reportedly described the company as being under severe financial pressure, in part because of a heavy debt burden. According to management, SE lacked the resources to replace equipment at generating plants and pay suppliers.
SE reports to the Slovak Ministry of Economy.
Like its neighbors in Eastern Europe using Soviet-designed nuclear plants, Czechoslovakia had adopted not only the technology but the regulatory model in place in the former U.S.S.R. That meant a single organization--the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)--promoted nuclear power and regulated nuclear plant operations. Within the AEC, the Nuclear Safety Inspectorate was responsible for issuing safety regulations.
Reformed Federal Body. In early 1991, the CSFR redefined the AEC's duties, making it responsible for nuclear safety but eliminating any involvement in promoting nuclear power.
The staff of the AEC's Nuclear Safety Inspectorate included 14 resident inspectors at the country's nuclear power plants. Separate Czech and Slovak regulatory bodies supported the work of the AEC in such areas as radiation protection, technical safety and fire protection.
The CSFR also established a national system for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information on safety-significant events at nuclear plants.
New Republic Entity. With the creation of separate Czech and Slovak republics in January 1993, regulatory bodies were established for each republic. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic, headed by Jozef Misak, has two sections: a nuclear safety policy section and a nuclear safety evaluation and inspection section. The evaluation and inspection section consists of departments for nuclear safety evaluation, systems and components, nuclear materials and physical protection, decommissioning and radioactive waste. The nuclear safety policy section consists of departments for international cooperation, legal and quality assurance matters, crisis management and management of the emergency response center, and general administration.
The authority has a staff of 69 people, seven of whom serve as resident inspectors at Bohunice and Mochovce.
The Slovak Republic has drafted national legislation that includes a provision making the license holder responsible for any nuclear damage resulting from an accident at a nuclear power plant. Pending enactment of the legislation, the Slovak government approved a declaration on civil liability for nuclear damage that makes SE liable for damage, with the government providing coverage for any claims. The legislation is expected to be approved by the Slovak Parliament in 1996.
In addition, a nuclear insurance pool for the Slovak Republic's reactors is expected to be established by mid-1996.
The Slovak Republic is a party to the Vienna Convention, which ensures that the responsibility for damage caused by a nuclear accident is channeled to the plant operator. The republic is also a party to the 1988 Joint Protocol on Civil Law Liability and Compensation for Cross-Boundary Damage from Nuclear Accident, which resolves potential conflicts between the Paris Convention--which covers 14 European countries--and the Vienna Convention--which has worldwide coverage.
Supply of Fuel. Nuclear fuel for the Bohunice plant has historically been supplied by Russia, but in 1992 SEP requested bids from other suppliers. It received five bids, one from Russia and the others from Western suppliers that proposed developing the VVER fuel. In March 1994, however, during discussions of Russian assistance to the Slovak Republic for completion of the Mochovce plant, the Russian Minister for External Economic Relations agreed to continue supplying fuel to the Slovak Republic.
SEP, together with the Czech utility CEZ, bought some 400 unused fuel assemblies from the closed Greifswald plant in former East Germany. In the fall of 1992, 111 of the assemblies were shipped to the Bohunice plant.
Spent Fuel Storage and Disposal. In the past, spent fuel from the Bohunice plant was kept for 10 years in the 600-metric-ton interim storage facility at the plant site and then sent to the former Soviet Union for reprocessing. Until the breakup of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic, the Dukovany plant sent its spent fuel to Bohunice's interim storage facility. But in 1993, the Slovak utility SEP--now SE--said it was no longer willing to accept Dukovany's spent fuel. In July 1995, SE began shipping Dukovany's spent fuel back to the Czech Republic plant, where an interim storage facility had been built and licensed.
During the summer of 1995, Bohunice plant management was attempting to renegotiate its agreement with Russia, and Russia was reportedly reviewing the agreement. According to the Slovak press, Russia's minister of atomic energy said during a December 1995 meeting with the Slovak Republic's economy minister that Russia would take back Bohunice's spent fuel in 1996. The interim storage facility at Bohunice will run out of capacity in 1997, and SE plans to build a long-term storage facility for spent fuel from the Bohunice and Mochovce plants. But Bohunice management has reportedly said that building its own permanent storage facility is not an option.
SEP, the Slovak utility, awarded several contracts to Western firms for safety-related improvements to both Bohunice and Mochovce. For details on specific improvements, see the summary section on the Bohunice plant.
Mochovce. Between 1988 and 1990, Siemens/KWU supplied loose-parts monitoring systems for all four Mochovce units, as well as component-vibration monitoring systems. SEP announced that it had chosen Siemens/KWU to supply instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment for the four Mochovce units, and by October 1993, I&C equipment furnished by Siemens had been installed in Mochovce units 1 and 2.
In the spring of 1992, safety experts and nuclear engineers from four organizations--Germany's GRS (Institute for Nuclear Safety) and Siemens, and France's IPSN (Institute of Nuclear Protection and Safety) and Framatome--audited Mochovce's design, quality of construction and training needs. The results showed that the plant could be backfitted to meet Western safety standards.
Joint Venture. To find ways of paying for completion of the Mochovce plant to Western safety standards, SEP engaged in discussions with Electricité de France and Germany's Bayernwerk and PreussenElektra. In January 1994, the utility signed an agreement with EdF establishing a joint venture--EMO--to finish the first two units at Mochovce. EdF owned 51 percent of EMO and SEP, 49 percent. Bayernwerk said it might also join EMO.
SEP--now SE--approached the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development about helping to finance the plant's completion, but both the bank and EdF insisted that any aid for Mochovce be conditional on a commitment by SEP to close units 1 and 2 at the Bohunice plant.
In 1994, Russia offered the Slovak Republic a credit of $450 million for the completion of the Mochovce plant. The Russian government also indicated that it might pay off some of its inherited debt to the Slovak Republic by supplying nuclear plant components.
In October 1994, the Slovak Republic's Nuclear Regulatory Authority reviewed a safety improvement report on Mochovce prepared by EdF with the help of SEP, Framatome and Siemens. In December 1994, the results of several studies were presented to the EBRD at a meeting on the project. One study, a least-cost analysis by the U.S. firm Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett, concluded that completion of the two Mochovce units would cost less than the alternatives analyzed, which included converting Mochovce to a combined-cycle combustion turbine plant, importing more electricity or relying more on combined heat and power production.
A safety analysis by Riskaudit, a Franco-German joint venture, noted that the bubble condenser--a vapor-suppression confinement structure--had been demonstrated to reliably prevent confinement overpressure in international testing. An environmental impact assessment prepared by the U.K.'s AEA Technology concluded that the two units could be upgraded to be consistent with Western safety requirements and practices.
Project Costs. EMO, the French-Slovak joint venture, estimated the cost of the project at roughly DM 1.452 billion ($980 million). The project sponsors sought DM 412.5 million ($278.4 million) from the EBRD and DM 366.3 million ($247.2 million) from Euratom. In early February 1995, following a meeting between Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin and Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar in Moscow, Slovak officials announced that Russia was interested in helping to complete the Mochovce units.
Project Opposition. Also in February 1995, the European Parliament passed a resolution opposing the completion of the Mochovce units because the project lacked sufficient safety guarantees. The resolution is not binding on either the European Commission or the European Investment Bank.
In early March, Slovak premier Vladimir Meciar said that the country could not comply with two of the EBRD's conditions for a loan for Mochovce--increasing energy prices by 29 percent by the end of March, and shutting down Bohunice units 1 and 2 in 1999-2000, even if the two Mochovce units had not yet come on line. In mid-March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for the EBRD and the European Union (EU) to freeze funds for Mochovce until the plant's economic advantages and safety could be demonstrated. In response, the Slovak Republic asked the EBRD to postpone its vote--planned for late March--on the loan for Mochovce.
Czech Offer. At the end of March, the Czech company Skoda Praha offered to complete the Mochovce plant, including safety improvements, for DM 700 million ($472.5 million)--about 30 percent less than the cost estimated by EMO. In early April, SE asked EdF to renegotiate its bid to lead a consortium to complete the plant.
In September, the Slovak government rejected the EBRD offer to help fund Mochovce's completion, saying the conditions were unacceptable. According to a spokesman of the Slovak Ministry of Economics, the government intended to pursue the offer from Skoda Praha, with financing from two Czech banks ($400 million), the Russian government ($80 million), and other sources, including EdF, the European Commission and commercial banks. Under the Czech offer, the plant could be completed for DM 1 billion ($675 million). The Slovak cabinet instructed the economics minister and the National Bank of Slovakia to develop a financing plan by the end of the year.
At the end of September, SE announced that it had chosen a Czech-Russian team--Skoda Praha and Energoproject of Prague, and Atomenergoeksport and Zarubezhatomenergostroy of Russia--to complete Mochovce. Germany's Siemens and France's Framatome would work with the Russian designers to provide safety upgrades. SE added that it was considering an offer of technical assistance from EdF. SE said it would sign contracts with investors at the beginning of 1996.
At the end of October, the Slovak Republic and Russia signed an agreement that included a provision on the completion of Mochovce. In addition to making a loan of $150 million for completing Unit 1, Russia will supply fuel for the plant and will reprocess the spent fuel. According to Russian atomic energy minister Viktor Mikhaylov, the completion of the second unit would require about $400 million. The Slovak press reported, however, that during a meeting between Mikhaylov and the Slovak Republic's economy minister in December 1995, Mikhaylov said Russia would give the Slovak Republic fuel and labor worth $70 million to defray the trade deficit with the republic that Russia had inherited from the former Soviet Union.
In December 1995, SE and EdF signed an agreement under which EdF will help with project management, quality assurance, scheduling, cost assessment, and the modernization program planned for Mochovce units 1 and 2. SE and the Slovak government were reportedly attempting to arrange for financing that would allow completion of the two units with the help of Czech and Russian engineering firms, with EdF providing technical assistance and France's Framatome and Germany's Siemens working as direct contractors to SE on safety upgrades.
Prior to the breakup of the CSFR, the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission was responsible for reviewing the qualifications and performance of nuclear plant operators.
There are three training centers for nuclear power plant personnel in the former federal republic, one for skilled workers in the Czech Republic, at Brno, and two in the Slovak Republic--one for skilled workers at Piestany and one for professional employees at Trnava. The Trnava training center has a full-scope VVER-440 Model V213 simulator. A second full-scope simulator is operational at the Mochovce plant.
The Nuclear Regulatory Authority is responsible for reviewing the qualifications and performance of plant operators and other staff, approving training programs, examining licensed personnel and issuing licenses.
Initial training of nuclear plant personnel consists of several phases:
Operators are licensed for two years, and must pass written, oral and practical examinations for license renewal.
After the collapse of its Communist regime, Czechoslovakia became increasingly active in international efforts to raise nuclear power plant safety and operation.
In 1991, the CSFR's deputy minister of economy requested cooperation from the West in all spheres of the country's nuclear power development policies, including upgrading nuclear units to the safety levels of Western Europe.
WANO Membership. The Slovak utility SEP is a member of the World Association of Nuclear Operators' (WANO's) Moscow Center. Under the auspices of WANO, representatives of the Bohunice plant have visited nuclear plants in the West (see individual plant summary).
Foratom Participation. The Czechoslovak Nuclear Forum, founded in 1990, became an associate of Foratom (the umbrella group for 14 European nuclear industry forums) that same year. In 1991, the forum hosted a Foratom meeting in Prague. No information is available on the status of the forum since the breakup of the CSFR.
Utility Partnerships. Under a utility partnership program jointly sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Energy Association (an association of public and private energy-related organizations that represents the United States on the World Energy Council), the Slovak utility SEP is paired with Southern Electric International. The partnerships involve exchanges of technical and economic information, seminars, and visits by managers to one another's plants.
EC Assistance. As part of its program of economic assistance to Eastern Europe--PHARE--the European Communities (now the European Union) earmarked 4.5 million European Currency Units (ECU) ($5.6 million) in 1990 for improvements to Czechoslovak plants, 3.5 million ECU ($4.4 million) in 1991 and 20 million ECU ($25.2 million) in 1992. The 1992 funding was intended for updating nuclear regulations, improving safety at the VVER-440 Model V213s and VVER-1000s, fuel cycle and waste management activities, and off-site emergency preparedness.
Projects funded under the PHARE program include a study of I&C replacement at Bohunice 3 and 4; a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of Bohunice 1 and 2; and operator training. In addition, the European Nuclear Assistance Consortium, consisting of eight European companies, has been awarded a contract under PHARE to carry out engineering safety audits of Bohunice 3 and 4. The project will look for differences in plant conditions between the two units.
Another PHARE-funded project, expected to begin in early 1996, entails the supply of computer models for severe accidents, training in their use, and a large program of analysis and development of VVER accident management programs. PHARE has also funded management training for nuclear power plant and regulatory staff.
IAEA Training Seminars. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is known for its inspection missions--including its Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team (ASSET) missions--to nuclear power plants, the agency also conducts ASSET training seminars at a country's request. The seminars are designed to train operators and regulators in the use of the ASSET methodology to identify safety issues, to assess their consequences and to eliminate the root causes of likely future accidents and incidents.
In February 1992, the IAEA held an ASSET training seminar in Senec near Bratislava in the Slovak Republic. The seminar was attended by 29 people from Czech and Slovak nuclear plants, the country's regulatory agency and its research center.
Included in the seminar were two workshops, one on the International Nuclear Event Scale and one on the application of the ASSET root-cause analysis to operating events at the Bohunice and Dukovany plants.
An ASSET training seminar, planned for Jan. 8-12, 1996, in Bratislava, will provide guidance for the prevention of incidents.
At the request of the CSFR, the IAEA inspected the Bohunice and Mochovce plants. The IAEA's missions to Bohunice are detailed in the separate summary of that plant.
Mochovce Pre-OSART. The Pre-OSART mission to the Slovak Republic's Mochovce plant took place in January 1993. Following the three-week mission, the team concluded that the plant management intends to improve overall performance and ensure acceptable levels of safety. It noted a commitment to nuclear safety and a willingness to make improvements.
The team identified several commendable features in the plant's program, including: management's commitment to training; design-related activities such as replacement of control room panels and VVER safety improvements; improvements in the use of computers to manage plant programs; and improvements in emergency planning and preparedness.
The team also suggested areas for improvement:
While acknowledging the plant's new quality assurance program and its use of international experience to improve management and safety programs, the team noted some aspects of existing safety and quality standards that needed to be strengthened, such as issuing a formal policy to provide safety guidance and using a nuclear safety review committee and a self-audit program.
The team suggested that staffing, training and the preparation and use of procedures all could be improved.
The team recommended that the plant staff play a stronger, more responsible role in monitoring and controlling the work of contractors and suppliers.
Finally, the team suggested scheduling in sufficient detail the work that remained to be done at the plant.
December 1995
