Bulgaria operates six units at its Kozloduy nuclear power plant--four first-generation VVER-440 Model V230s, and two third-generation VVER-1000s.
Nuclear power supplies nearly 46 percent of the electricity produced by the country's utility, the National Electric Company (NEC). In the past year or two, however, that share has often risen to nearly 50 percent because of thermal plant inefficiency, fuel shortages and inadequate rainfall for hydropower. Thermal (coal, oil and gas) plants account for about 48 percent of all electricity generated by NEC, and hydro for about 6 percent.
Since the collapse of the Communist regime, the Bulgarian government has cooperated with Western organizations seeking to provide help in upgrading the Kozloduy plant, particularly the older VVER-440 Model V230s.
To meet projected demand and the possible shutdown of Kozloduy units 1 and 2 by the end of the decade, the Bulgarian Energy Committee and the state utility are developing a plan for a second nuclear plant at Belene. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency has offered to finance a study that would address such a plan.
Construction of a VVER-1000 plant was begun at Belene in 1986 but, in light of local protests, the country's economic slowdown and concerns about seismic risks, the Bulgarian government decided in mid-1991 to stop the project. The original project called for construction of two units initially, with another four units to be built at a later date.
In early 1993, however, the general director of Energoproject--a Bulgarian energy research institute--said that officials were considering resuming construction at the Belene site because Bulgaria has no alternative to nuclear energy. Bulgarian and Russian officials met in October 1994 to discuss cooperating in the completion of the plant. Russia reportedly offered to supply the major equipment for the plant.
Bulgaria has reportedly already invested approximately $1.3 billion in the plant, and the National Electric Company says it is likely to upgrade Unit 1, which is 65 percent built, to meet international safety standards. The second unit, however, will probably be an advanced design. Among the contenders are Westinghouse's AP600 and Russia's 500-megawatt reactor. Completion of the plant would cost an estimated $1.2 billion.
In July 1995, Bulgarian radio reported that experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency had visited the Belene site to study its seismic suitability, and reported that there were no seismological hazards.
Before work could resume at Belene, the site would have to be licensed by the Bulgarian nuclear regulatory authority, which would also carry out a preliminary safety analysis before issuing a construction permit. A preliminary environmental impact statement was completed before construction was halted. The country's environmental protection law, amended by the Bulgarian government in 1995, stipulates that projects already under construction do not require an environmental impact assessment.
During talks in November 1995, Russian and Bulgarian officials discussed the possible supply of advanced Russian reactors for Belene as well as the upgrading of the VVER-1000 unit at the site. A Bulgarian official reportedly said that the plant could not be built unless Russian organizations were responsible for construction work and project management. According to an official of Russia's Atomenergoeksport, Russia is prepared to allocate credits for the completion of the Belene plant.
In January 1996, representatives of the city council in Svishtov, site of the Belene plant, told representatives of the National Electric Company, the Committee on Power Supply, and Energoproekt that the city council was opposed to the completion of the plant.
Bulgaria struggles to meet the country's demand for electricity. With virtually no reserve capacity, it must impose brownouts and electricity rationing when a power plant is forced off line. Bulgaria has traditionally imported electricity and coal from Ukraine, both of which were disrupted during the winter of 1991-1992. In February 1993, Bulgaria signed a new contract with Ukraine for the supply of electricity and coal, but in November of that year Ukraine halted power deliveries. During the winter of 1994-1995, disruption of coal supplies from Ukraine, which provided the fuel for 1,250 megawatts of Bulgaria's thermal capacity, forced the country to increase its reliance on nuclear energy and hydropower.
According to government officials, Bulgaria will attempt to resolve its electricity supply problems in the near term through a combination of government expenditures and foreign assistance. The country will focus on upgrading its thermal and hydroelectric generating plants, improving the safety of Kozloduy and building new gas-fired power plants. Bulgaria also intends to increase its sale of electricity abroad, exporting power to Turkey and Greece.
In December 1995, the executive director of the National Electric Company said there were no concerns about meeting electricity demand during the winter. He added that all units at Kozloduy were on line, as well as the country's thermal plants.
Energy Policy Development. The Bulgarian Energy Committee, which formerly had some policy-making duties, is now charged with developing a national energy policy. In the early 1990s, the committee advised the government to backfit the Kozloduy units to permit continued operation, warning that the country could not afford the level of energy imports that would be necessitated by a shutdown of the plant.
Between 1991 and 1993, NEC undertook a comprehensive program for upgrading Kozloduy units 1-4. The program focused first on units 1 and 2, with the aim of restoring them to their original operating condition and improving their reliability and safety. Subsequently, units 3 and 4 were subject to a short-term upgrading effort.
In July 1995, the National Assembly's Committee on Power Supply introduced a new energy strategy. Under the strategy, which addressed electricity supply to the year 2020, a new nuclear plant--probably the one at Belene--would go into service after 2010. Kozloduy units 1-4 would operate until 2003, and units 5 and 6 until 2010. The strategy also called for the construction of 1,500 megawatts of coal-fired generating capacity, the modernization of 1,200 megawatts of hydropower, and the construction of a pumped storage plant. The parliamentary committee's projections called for nuclear energy to supply 30-40 percent of the country's electricity, coal to supply 30 percent, natural gas, 12 percent, and hydropower, 7 percent. Bulgaria would import the rest of the electricity it needed.
In October 1995, the Committee on Power Supply announced a revised version of its energy strategy. Under this version, a decision on completing the construction of the Belene nuclear power plant would be postponed until feasibility studies were undertaken. However, the committee's chairman, Konstantin Rusinov, disagreed that construction at Belene should be postponed, and reportedly said he would take up the issue with the deputy prime minister.
In November 1995, the Bulgarian government approved the energy strategy, which includes a study of licensing the Belene plant, an evaluation of the condition of equipment already on-site, and an investigation of the possible completion of Unit 1 or the construction of an advanced design reactor. Under the strategy, construction at Belene would be dependent on decommissioning plans for Kozloduy units 1 and 2. The strategy must now be debated in Parliament.
In January 1996, the government's Committee on European Integration said that Bulgaria would commit itself to steadily modernizing its nuclear facilities in conformity with European standards.
Utility Operations. In addition to its policy-making duties, the Energy Committee formerly served as the state-run utility. Now that the committee is devoted solely to energy policy, the responsibility for electricity generation, transmission and distribution has been transferred to the National Electric Company, which is state-owned. Although there are no immediate plans to privatize the company, it is being restructured to improve the economical generation, transmission and distribution of electricity.
Electricity Pricing. In January 1993, electricity prices for residential customers were increased by 20 percent. But to qualify for a World Bank energy sector loan, the Bulgarian Energy Committee proposed raising prices again in May. Under the proposal, electricity prices for residential users would rise by 50 percent, and those for commercial users, by 5.5 percent. The committee proposed raising rates again on April 1, 1994, this time by 62-67 percent for residential users and anywhere from 28 to 45 percent for industrial users, depending on the dollar value of the Bulgarian leva. The government approved the increases.
In February 1995, Bulgaria's deputy prime minister announced that electricity prices would rise by an average 33 percent on March 1. Industrial customers would see an increase of 28.4 percent, and residential customers, an increase of 47 percent.
Bulgaria is a party to the Vienna Convention, which ensures that the responsibility for damage caused by a nuclear accident is channeled to the plant operator. The country is also a party to the 1988 Joint Protocol on Civil Law Liability and Compensation for Cross-Boundary Damage from Nuclear Accident, which resolves potential conflicts between the Paris Convention--which covers 14 European countries--and the Vienna Convention--which has worldwide coverage.
Bulgaria enacted national legislation on nuclear energy--the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Act--in August 1995. Under the act, which channels responsibility for damage caused by a nuclear accident to the plant operator, the operator's liability is set at 15 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR) ($10.1 million). SDRs, based on the rate for a basket of currencies, are used to settle international accounts. If insurance and financial guarantees do not cover claims up to 15 million SDR, the state will pay the difference to a total of 15 million SDR. Bulgaria also is taking steps to set up an insurance pool to cover civil liabilities in the event of an accident at a nuclear facility.
Supply of Fuel. In March 1993, the Bulgarian utility NEC signed a five-year agreement with Russia for the supply of nuclear fuel. NEC has agreed to pay for the fuel in hard currency, but the price will be negotiated for each shipment of fuel.
In November 1994, the Bulgarian Energy Committee announced that Moldova had agreed to allow the transshipment of Russian fresh fuel across its territory to Bulgaria. The committee added that it intended to negotiate with Ukraine on a long-term agreement for the transshipment of nuclear fuel across Ukrainian territory.
In June 1995, Kozloduy's manager Kozma Kuzmanov said that the plant needed 6 billion leva ($83.3 million) to purchase fuel. By October, Bulgaria had reportedly reached agreement with Russia on the supply of, and payment for, fuel for units 4 and 5. In addition, Ukraine agreed to allow Russian fuel to cross its territory on the way to Bulgaria. The fuel arrived in late October. In late November, Romania briefly detained a ship carrying fuel for Kozloduy Unit 3. The fuel arrived at the plant in early December.
Spent Fuel Storage and Disposal. Until 1990, spent fuel from the Kozloduy plant was sent to the former Soviet Union for reprocessing under a bilateral agreement. But with the expiration of the agreement, spent fuel from the plant's four 440-megawatt VVER units was stored on site. The on-site storage facility, which cannot accommodate spent fuel from the plant's two 1000-megawatt VVER units, was expected to exhaust its capacity in 1995.
In 1993, Russia offered to accept spent fuel for reprocessing again, but at a cost of $1,000 per kilogram. In response, Bulgarian Energy Committee officials proposed the construction of a spent fuel storage facility near the Kozloduy plant. Nine companies responded to an international solicitation for a storage facility technology, and NEC is considering proposals from three companies, two in France and one in Spain. In May 1995, NEC chairman Dyanko Dobrev reportedly said that a decision on building a spent fuel storage facility would be made by the end of the year.
In June 1994, Russia agreed to reprocess spent fuel from Kozloduy units 5 and 6, but refused to accept fuel from units 1-4. In March 1995, however, Bulgarian Energy Committee chairman Nikita Shervashidze announced that--following official talks in Moscow--Russia had agreed to continue reprocessing spent fuel from units 1-4.
The Bulgarian Committee on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy, which is chaired by Yanko Yanev, has a dual role: It regulates nuclear power plant operations and promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the chief nuclear regulatory official in the country, Yanev is responsible for regulating the operation of the Kozloduy units.
Within the committee is an inspectorate division, which is responsible for establishing safety requirements that all nuclear licensees must meet, verifying that the requirements are met, establishing licensing requirements, processing license applications and issuing licenses. One of the Inspectorate's units--the division of safe operation of nuclear installations--provides on-site inspectors. There are six such inspectors at the Kozloduy plant and the Emergency Response Center.
In April 1995, Yanev announced that the committee planned to establish a fund for decommissioning Kozloduy.
Bulgaria is cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and other international bodies to improve the safety of its nuclear units. For details, see the separate section on the Kozloduy plant.
Training. Kozloduy has an on-site training center, where classroom instruction is given to operators. The plant has no simulator, but operators are able to train on the full-scope simulator at Russia's Novovoronezh plant. A simulator that can handle up to design-basis accidents is being provided under the EU's PHARE program of economic assistance to Eastern Europe, and was to have been installed at Kozloduy by the end of 1995. It is based on Kozloduy's Unit 3. NEC has signed a contract with the U.S. firm S3 Technologies for the supply of a full-scope VVER-1000 simulator. S3 is also providing a three-phase simulator program for the plant.
The U.K. government has provided equipment for the training center. In addition, the Bulgarians have drafted emergency operating procedures.
Plant operators and shift supervisors spend 2½ to five years in training and must renew their licenses every five years.
Staff Pay. In the past, Kozloduy had problems attracting and retaining qualified personnel because of low pay levels. In the fall of 1991, however, salaries were raised, which helped to improve plant operation by halting the departure of skilled staff.
Payment for electricity produced by the Kozloduy plant is received by the National Electric Company, which--because of its own debts--has failed to pass on full payment to the plant. As a result, the plant may face serious difficulties in financing necessary safety-related improvements, according to chief regulator Yanev.
In June 1995, the Bulgarian government granted a 2 billion leva ($27.8 million) loan to NEC for use at Kozloduy. However, the money was earmarked for NEC's investment program and had to be spent on capital investments. Kozloduy, on the other hand, needed funding to buy fuel and carry out urgent maintenance work.
Bulgaria has established ties with such organizations as IAEA and WANO. Under the auspices of WANO, representatives of the Kozloduy plant have visited a nuclear plant in the West (see the Kozloduy plant summary for details).
Bulgaria has also appealed to the countries in the Group of 24--essentially, the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development--for assistance in improving the safety of the Kozloduy plant.
Through its PHARE program, the European Union (EU) organization earmarked 11.5 million ECU ($14.5 million) in emergency assistance to Bulgaria.
Projects included:
A study of the country's electrical grid and alternative electricity-supply options.
A "twinning program" in which the staffs of Kozloduy and nuclear plants in Western Europe would share operating experience; a plant "housekeeping" program; and a special WANO-organized, six-month safety analysis.
Regulatory Support. A consortium of European safety authorities--led by France's IPSN (Institute of Nuclear Protection and Safety) and including Germany's GRS (Institute for Reactor Safety), the U.K.'s Nuclear Installations Inspectorate and AEA Technology, and Belgium's AIB-Vincotte Nucleaire--is helping the Bulgarian authorities set up a Western-style licensing procedure. Using funding from the EU's PHARE program, the consortium has looked at the legal and regulatory framework in Bulgaria, and the approach to be used by the Bulgarian Committee on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy when reviewing requests for the restart of a unit or its continued operation. For example, the committee checked regularly on the progress in upgrading Unit 2, and issued an operating license when the work was satisfactorily completed.
IAEA Training Seminars. Although the IAEA is known for its inspection missions--including its Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team (ASSET) missions--to nuclear power plants, the agency also conducts ASSET training seminars at a country's request. The seminars are designed to train operators and regulators in the use of the ASSET methodology to identify safety issues, to assess their consequences and to eliminate the root causes of likely future accidents and incidents.
In March 1992, an ASSET seminar on prevention of incidents was held in Sofia. The seminar, requested by Bulgaria's Committee on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy, was attended by 28 people from Kozloduy, the regulatory agency and two energy research institutes. The purpose of the seminar was to familiarize participants with the ASSET approach to operational safety and the tools used by ASSET missions to identify, rate the significance of, and analyze the root causes of operational safety events.
In September 1992, the IAEA held a second ASSET training seminar at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant at the request of WANO. The seminar was attended by 30 people, including representatives from WANO and the Bulgarian regulatory agency.
Other Cooperative Agreements. In February 1993, Electricité de France (EdF) and NEC signed an agreement under which EdF would increase assistance to both the utility and the Kozloduy plant. EdF would contribute FF 10 million ($1.97 million) for the purchase by NEC of equipment and spare parts for Kozloduy. In addition, EdF--together with the U.K.'s Nuclear Electric--would help Bulgaria get financing from national and international organizations for upgrading the Kozloduy reactors.
Utility Grid Support. According to NEC, Bulgaria planned to complete by 1996 the preliminary work needed to connect the country's electricity grid with that of Western Europe. It has applied to the World Bank for a $93 million loan to help it rebuild the country's energy infrastructure, with some of the money going to the East-West grid link.
Utility Partnerships. Under a utility partnership program jointly sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Energy Association (an association of public and private energy-related organizations that represents the United States on the World Energy Council), NEC is paired with Central Maine Power Co. The partnerships involve exchanges of technical and economic information, seminars, and visits by managers to one another's plants.
Bulgaria has drawn heavily on IAEA expertise in the past year, asking the agency to send inspection teams to Kozloduy and requesting IAEA follow-up to those missions. For details, see the summary of the Kozloduy plant.
Pre-OSART Mission. In 1990, the Bulgarian government asked the IAEA to send a team of experts to Belene, where two VVER-1000 units were under construction.
An IAEA Pre-Operational Safety Review Team (Pre-OSART) mission visited the site July 2-20, 1990, to review construction activities and preparations for plant operation. Among the team's recommendations were:
January 1996
